Moral Disarmament: Reviving a Legacy of the Great War by Fry, James D. & Nair, Saroj
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 40 Issue 1 
2018 
Moral Disarmament: Reviving a Legacy of the Great War 
James D. Fry 
University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law 
Saroj Nair 
University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the International Humanitarian Law Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James D. Fry & Saroj Nair, Moral Disarmament: Reviving a Legacy of the Great War, 40 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 
(2018). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol40/iss1/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
MORAL DISARMAMENT: REVIVING A 
LEGACY OF THE GREAT WAR
James D. Fry* & Saroj Nair**
I.  Introduction
The first Nobel Peace Laureate, Frédéric Passy, criticized co-laureate 
Henri Dunant and the Red Cross Movement when he wrote, “You do not 
humanize war. You get rid of war by becoming more human.”1 Dunant’s 
sharing of the prize with Passy came as a shock to peace activists through-
out the world because Dunant was not involved in any peace movements, 
and it was assumed that this prize was reserved for peace efforts.2 Peace ac-
tivists saw Dunant’s work as completely unrelated to peace because the Red 
Cross Movement and the resulting international humanitarian law did not 
aim to prevent war.3 Indeed, the principle of humanity, which forms the 
bedrock of international humanitarian law (“IHL”) and essentially all other 
principles that fall under that umbrella, aims only at limiting superfluous in-
jury and unnecessary suffering during armed conflict,4 not at preventing 
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1. See IRWIN ABRAMS, THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE AND THE LAUREATES 41 (2001). 
2. Id.; Geir Lundestad, The Nobel Peace Prize, in THE NOBEL PRIZE: THE FIRST ONE 
HUNDRED YEARS 163, 166, 168 (Agneta Wallin Levinovitz & Nils Ringertz eds., 2001); 
DAVID P. FORSYTHE, THE HUMANITARIANS: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED 
CROSS 22–23 (2005); see also F.M. Carroll, Book Review, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 419, 420 (1988) 
(reviewing BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN PEACE LEADERS (Harold Josephson ed., 
1985)) (listing Passy as one of commonly accepted peace leaders of the world but not listing 
Dunant); James L. Tryon, The Rise of the Peace Movement, 20 YALE L.J. 358, 370–71 (1911) 
(same). 
3. See ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 41. 
4. See Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
art. 23, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Regulations]; Pro-
tocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts pmbl., arts. 35–36, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
3; Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 543 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998); see also EDWARD K. KWAKWA, THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: PERSONAL AND MATERIAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION 34–38
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war. As commentators have observed, IHL—and its core principle of hu-
manity—in a way perpetuates war by giving combatants greater hope of 
surviving hostilities, thereby enabling recruitment and the following of or-
ders.5 All of this will come as somewhat of a shock to commentators who 
essentially exalt Dunant for his contributions to global peace.6 To be clear, 
this assertion is not the same as Pufendorf’s outright rejection of IHL for 
being against the design of nature that only delays the return to natural 
peace.7 Instead, this Article asserts that IHL and its principle of humanity 
are not optimal bases for pressing for disarmament, especially nuclear dis-
armament. Some commentators, most notably Theodor Meron, push to hu-
manize IHL by moving away from reciprocity of obligations toward abso-
lute obligations on states in limiting suffering during times of armed 
conflict.8 However, the majority view of the lex lata of IHL does not cur-
rently reflect this perspective.9 Passy’s quote against IHL and the principle 
of humanity invite us to consider whether we must look at war and dis-
armament from a much broader human context if we eventually are to make 
significant progress.
A survey of recent nuclear disarmament law scholarship indicates that 
reliance on IHL and its core principle of humanity has gained considerable 
(1992); Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public 
Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 78, 84 (2000); Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of 
Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 101, 127–28 (2010).
5. See, e.g., Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A 
Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 49, 56–58 (1994); FRITS 
KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR: AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 203–04 (3rd ed. 2001);
FIONA TERRY, CONDEMNED TO REPEAT? THE PARADOX OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 23–26
(2002).
6. See, e.g., Morris Davis, The United States and International Humanitarian Law: 
Building It Up, Then Tearing It Down, 39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 983, 991–92 (2014); 
JEAN PICTET, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE RED CROSS 18 (1979); André Durand, The 
Development of the Idea of Peace in the Thinking of Henry Dunant, 26 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 16 (1986); C.G. WEERAMANTRY, UNIVERSALISING INTERNATIONAL LAW 407 (2004) 
(listing Dunant as a famous peace worker).
7. See Christopher C. Joyner, International Law in the 21st Century: Rules for Global 
Governance 16–17 (2005) (referencing and analyzing Pufendorf’s various books on this sub-
ject, including Samuel Pufendorf, Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis Libri Duo [Two
Books on the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence] (1672), translated in Classics of Interna-
tional Law (James Brown Scott ed., William Abbot Oldfather trans., 1931) and Samuel Puf-
endorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo [Eight Books on the Law of Nature and Na-
tions] (1688), translated in Classics of International Law (James Brown Scott ed. C.H. 
Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., 1934). 
8. See THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9–15
(2006).
9. See generally BRYAN PEELER, THE PERSISTENCE OF RECIPROCITY: GENEVA 
CONVENTION III AND THE WAR ON TERROR (forthcoming 2019); Sean Watts, Reciprocity and 
the Law of War, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 365 (2009); James D. Morrow, How Does Reciprocity 
Work? Evidence from the Laws of War (unpublished manuscript) (2005), https://
www.law.berkeley.edu/files/spring05_Morrow.pdf.
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support.10 Not surprisingly, nuclear disarmament advocacy has followed in 
the same path, usually under the banner of the humanitarian impact move-
ment.11 Some have criticized this movement for diluting the debates over 
how the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (the “NPT”) regime should 
evolve. Particularly, no one involved in the movement can agree on the next 
step: some say that they should work toward banning nuclear weapons, 
some desire increased efforts to close the gaps in the NPT, and others assert 
that the NPT is not the proper framework for getting rid of nuclear weap-
ons.12
Notwithstanding this and other criticism, the International Campaign to 
Abolish Nuclear Weapons (the “ICAN”) won the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize 
for emphasizing the negative humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons—the 
basis of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.13 Given the 
fundamental disconnect between peace and the IHL principle of humanity, 
and given how the International Court of Justice (the “ICJ”) determined in 
its 1996 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion 
that it “does not have sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with cer-
10. See, e.g., DANIEL RIETIKER, HUMANIZATION OF ARMS CONTROL: PAVING THE 
WAY FOR A WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (2018); Jonathan Granoff, Pacta Sunt 
Servanda: Nuclear Weapons and Global Secure Sustainable Development, 21 SW. J. INT’L L.
311, 323–25 (2015); Hiroaki Nakanishi, Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: How Can 
the World Resolve the Disharmony Between the UNSC and the UNGA?, 43 VICT. U.
WELLINGTON L. REV. 617, 630–38 (2012); Charles J. Moxley Jr. et al., Nuclear Weapons and 
Compliance with International Humanitarian Law and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 595, 612–14, 637–69 (2011).
11. This movement also has been referred to on the basis of humanitarian imperative, 
humanitarian consequences and humanitarian action. See, e.g., Thomas E. Doyle II, Moral 
and Political Necessities for Nuclear Disarmament: An Applied Ethical Analysis, STRATEGIC 
STUD. Q., Summer 2015, at 19 (citing, inter alia, ARIELLE DENIS, BANNING NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS: AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE (2014)); David A. Koplow, You’re Gonna Need a Big-
ger Boat: Alternatives to the UN Security Council for Enforcing Nuclear Disarmament and 
Human Rights, 29 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 135, 158–61 (2016) (citing, inter alia, NICK RITCHIE,
INT’L LAW & POLICY INST. & UN INSTIT. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, THE 
HUMANITARIAN INITIATIVE IN 2015 (2015)); Granoff, supra note 10, at 311, 315–16 (2015) 
(citing, inter alia, THE HOLY SEE, NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: TIME FOR ABOLITION 5 (2014); 
Report from the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (2013), http://
www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/oslo-2013/HINW-
report.pdf; J. Adele Buckley, An Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone: Circumpolar Non-
Nuclear Weapons States Must Originate Negotiations, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 167, 173–
75 (2013); Moxley et al., supra note 10, at 683–86; Charles J. Moxley Jr., Obama’s Nuclear 
Posture Review: An Ambitious Program for Nuclear Arms Control but a Retreat from the Ob-
jective of Nuclear Disarmament, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 734, 737–39 (2011). This Article 
uses these terms interchangeably. 
12. See, e.g., Lewis Dunn, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Pro-
cess: Looking Back to 2015, Looking Forward to 2020, Paper Presented at the Vienna Center 
for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (Apr. 8, 2016) (notes on file with the author).
13. See Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons pmbl., ¶¶ 2–3, 8–11, 24, July 7, 
2017, UN Doc. A/Conf.229/2017/8; see also Press Release, Nobel Prize, The Nobel Peace 
Prize 2017 (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2017/press-release/.
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tainty that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with 
the principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict [or IHL and the 
principle of humanity] in any circumstance,”14 one is left to wonder whether 
there might not be a better path to peace through nuclear disarmament. In 
extending Passy’s idea to nuclear disarmament, this Article resurrects from 
the period following the First World War—or the Great War, as some refer 
to it—the human-centered principle of moral disarmament and explores its 
usefulness as a “new” or additional foundation for peace through nuclear 
disarmament. This focus on an important principle that flowed from the 
Great War also represents a fitting way to commemorate the 100th anniver-
sary of its official conclusion.
As a brief disclaimer, the reader might see the word “moral” in the 
phrase “moral disarmament” and expect analysis relating to ethical obliga-
tions to disarm based on the principal sense of the word.15 However, this Ar-
ticle’s use of “moral” goes beyond this meaning to include a focus on dis-
armament through society’s development, both economically and from a 
human dimension. This Article seeks to use the term “moral” as it was con-
strued during the interwar period, especially at the Conference for the Re-
duction and Limitation of Armaments (the “Disarmament Conference”).
This definition of “moral” exists as the tertiary sense in the dictionary and 
means “[d]esignating the incidental effect of an action or event . . . in pro-
ducing confidence or discouragement . . . .” and is juxtaposed with “materi-
al,”16 as in “material disarmament.” This Article’s advocacy of a shift to a 
broad, human-centered approach to disarmament resembles the develop-
ment of the notion of human security in the mid-1990s,17 with its focus on 
the security of citizens in their daily activities, instead of just focusing on 
14. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
Rep. 226, ¶95 (July 8); accord Timothy McCormack, From Solferino to Sarajevo: A Continu-
ing Role for International Humanitarian Law?, 21 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 621, 633–34
(1997); see also Malcolm N. Shaw, Nuclear Weapons and International Law, in NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 9 (Istvan Pogany ed., 1987); Burns H. Weston, Nu-
clear Weapons and the World Court: Ambiguity’s Consensus, 7 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 371, 383–92 (1997) (analyzing the ambiguity embedded in the Court’s decision on 
this point, thereby lending support to both sides of the argument). 
15. See, e.g. Moral, Oxford English Dictionary (Online), http://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/122086 (last visited Nov. 26, 2018) (listing “ethical” as part of the main definition); 
THOMAS E. DOYLE, II, THE ETHICS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DISSEMINATION: MORAL 
DILEMMAS OF ASPIRATION, AVOIDANCE, AND PREVENTION (2015); Mary Eileen E. McGrath, 
Nuclear Weapons: The Crisis of Conscience, 107 MIL. L. REV. 191 (1985) (looking at nuclear 
weapons from a religious perspective); Jonathan Granoff, Nuclear Weapons, Ethics, Morals, 
and Law, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1413 (2000) (discussing the ethical obligation of states to disarm 
themselves of nuclear weapons).
16. Moral, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, definition 3(d), http://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/122086 (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
17. See, e.g., Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security (Sean M. 
Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller eds., 1995); Common Security in Asia: New Concepts in Hu-
man Security (Tatsuro Matsumae & Lincoln C. Chen eds., 1995). 
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state security as had been customary in international security studies before 
that point in time.18 Just as the 1994 United Nations (“UN”) Human Devel-
opment Report identified new elements that were relevant to understanding 
human security—such as economic, environmental, personal, community, 
health, political, and food19 —this Article advocates an equally broad ap-
proach to disarmament, which the 1932 Disarmament Conference did when 
initially introducing the principle of moral disarmament. At the core of this 
idea is the belief that genuine societal stability, through promotion of as-
pects like economic growth, is needed to realize long-lasting disarmament.
This Article is divided into six parts, including this introduction and a 
conclusion. Part II outlines the history that shaped the disarmament efforts 
leading up to the 1932 Disarmament Conference, when the principle of 
moral disarmament was first introduced and debated. This Part focuses on 
the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations; the 1925 Protocol for the Pro-
hibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and 
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (or 1925 Geneva Protocol); the 1928 
General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy 
(or Kellogg-Briand Pact); and the 1929 Geneva Convention for the Amelio-
ration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field (or 
1929 Geneva Convention) as they relate to the notion of moral disarma-
ment. Part III analyzes in detail how the 1932 Disarmament Conference it-
self nurtured but ultimately scuttled the notion of moral disarmament. This 
Part focuses on the documents of the Preparatory Commission for the 1932 
Disarmament Conference and the documents of the 1932 Disarmament 
Conference itself to understand how they envisioned moral disarmament 
and its accompanying principles and institutions. Part IV analyzes the po-
tential relationship between development and disarmament in an effort to 
identify the value in adopting the principle of moral disarmament. Finally, 
Part V applies the principle of moral disarmament to contemporary discus-
sions regarding nuclear disarmament. Focusing on moral disarmament adds 
significant value to the discourse by tying disarmament to development: 
economic and human improvement help rid societies of the insecurity that 
typically drives states toward arms—even nuclear arms—in the first place.
18. See, e.g., Nicholas Thomas & William T. Tow, The Utility of Human Security: Sov-
ereignty and Humanitarian Intervention, 33 SECURITY DIALOGUE 177 (2002); Jessica T. 
Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 1997, at 50. Likewise, this shift resembles the 
shift of a few international law commentators in defining “humanity” outside the IHL context 
as being “the legal principle that human rights, interests, needs, and security must be respected 
and promoted.” Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and ????????????????, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 513, 
513 (2009). But see Anne Peters, Introduction to Symposium on Global Animal Law, 111 
ASIL UNBOUND 252, 256 (2017) (appearing to adopt a more traditional IHL-based definition 
of “humanity” that relates to superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering). Ostensibly no-
body within the disarmament law discourse uses this broader definition of “humanity,” which 
gives uniqueness and value to this Article’s thesis. 
19. See generally U.N. Dev. Programme, Human Development Report 1994, at 22–40
(1994).
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In short, this Article examines the concept of moral disarmament using 
a broad-spectrum definition of humanity rather than the traditional IHL per-
spective. Rather than referring to human rights that are impacted by arma-
ments, this Article looks at methods through which human initiative can 
create a society that truly hungers for disarmament. In other words, this Ar-
ticle points out that the extent of change that society can bring about 
through education, intellectual cooperation, peace initiatives, international 
affairs awareness, and intercultural communication can be reflected in the 
economic growth, social growth, and development of states. The aim is to 
help the reader envisage a world where moral disarmament is part of the 
fabric of society, thus helping to create an environment where people begin 
to see disarmament as a way of life or a natural result of the peace and pros-
perity that they otherwise enjoy.
II. Moral Disarmament in Historical Context
A. Overview
The world today can well be viewed through the legacies bequeathed 
from the greatest conflicts mankind has known in the twentieth century. One 
such legacy is the League of Nations, which drew its first breath in the im-
mediate aftermath of the First World War. The Covenant of the League of 
Nations required all States to reduce their arms “to the lowest point con-
sistent with national safety.”20 Various agreements were discussed and 
brought to the negotiating table in the interwar period, but one of the more 
noteworthy agreements was the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which sought to 
abolish the use of force in international relations.21 It was also a pre-cursor 
to the 1932 Disarmament Conference.22 The 1932 Disarmament Conference 
was the first global conference that brought states to the negotiating table to 
discuss “a universal reduction and limitation of all types of armaments.”23
The participating states were asked beforehand—pursuant to Article 8 of the 
1919 Covenant of the League of Nations—to abstain from any increases in 
20. See League of Nations Covenant art. 8.
21. See generally General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National 
Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]; Jo-
seph Preston Baratta, The Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Outlawry of War, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT 695 (Richard Dean Burns ed., 1993); Har-
old Josephson, Outlawing War: Internationalism and the Pact of Paris, 3 DIPLOMATIC HIST.
377 (1979).
22. See Jill M. Sheldon, Nuclear Weapons and the Laws of War: Does Customary In-
ternational Law Prohibit the Use of Nuclear Weapons in All Circumstances, 20 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 181, 222–23 (1996).
23. See JOZEF GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL: THE NEW GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND
AGREEMENTS 24 (2d ed. 2002). 
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their armaments for a period of one year.24 This was later extended for an-
other four months.25
One of the issues that the Disarmament Conference’s commissions and 
committees examined in great detail was the principle of moral disarma-
ment.26 It is noteworthy that moral disarmament was brought up with the in-
tention of creating an environment conducive to peace in international rela-
tions. There already was agreement among the negotiating states that a 
reduction of defense expenditures and a limitation of arms was the immedi-
ate priority, as expressed in Article 8(4) of the 1919 Covenant of the League 
of Nations:
The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private 
enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave ob-
jections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant 
upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to 
the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able 
to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for 
their safety.27
Through this provision, the international community hoped to avoid war in 
the future by limiting arms trafficking, which were seen as directly connect-
ed.28 However, the idea that arms trafficking directly was connected to war 
was not a novel concept. In the period following the First World War, there 
already existed the notion that a reduction of armaments would lead to the 
development of a peaceful society. In fact, in the late nineteenth century, 
Russia urged other European states to reduce military expenditures and in-
stead focus on building the global economy or otherwise promoting the bet-
terment of people’s lives.29 During the interwar period, the international 
community tried to impress upon a more universal audience this nexus be-
tween disarmament and development.
In the run up to and during the 1932 Disarmament Conference, many in 
the international community sought to link the concept of moral disarma-
ment to “education, cooperation among intellectuals, the press, broadcast-
24. See Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Report by the 
Spanish Representative Adopted by the Council on September 30th, 1931, League of Nations 
Doc. C.639(1).1931.IX (1931), http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le000018.pdf;
see also GOLDBLAT, supra note 23, at 24 (mentioning this source).
25. See Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Armaments Truce 
(Renewal), at 1, League of Nations Doc. Conf.D.144 (1932), http://digital.library.
northwestern.edu/league/le000019.pdf; see also GOLDBLAT, supra note 23, at 24 (mentioning 
this source).
26. See also GOLDBLAT, supra note 23, at 25–28. 
27. See League of Nations Covenant art. 8, ¶ 4. 
28. See David G. Anderson, The International Arms Trade: Regulating Conventional 
Arms Transfers in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, 7 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 749, 759–60
(1992). 
29. See GOLDBLAT, supra note 23, at 19. 
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ing, theatre and cinema.”30 The Conference’s Committee on Moral Dis-
armament (the “Committee”) adopted a text stating that, “parties should un-
dertake to ensure that education at every stage should be so conceived as to 
inspire mutual respect between peoples and emphasize their interdepend-
ence. . . . [P]arties would ensure that persons entrusted with education and 
preparing textbooks were inspired by these principles[.]”31 The text also 
called for using public broadcasting—through channels like the cinema—to 
promote feelings of peace and friendship between states.32 In short, the text 
required states to avoid any program that could disrupt friendly relations be-
tween states or incite disharmony in international relations, all in the name 
of disarmament.
To further realize disarmament, the Committee considered a proposal to 
change municipal laws in such a way as to develop friendly international 
relations.33 It proposed the introduction of legislation that enabled “punish-
ment for certain acts detrimental to good relations among states.”34 The 
Committee also recommended that the “parties should pledge themselves to 
consider introducing into their state constitutions an article prohibiting re-
sort to force as an instrument of national policy, embodying thereby the 
principles of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact.”35 Thus, it can be appreciated 
that, in the interwar period, there was a movement trying to nudge states to 
submerse themselves holistically into the moral disarmament principle. 
There was conscious optimism that, as society assimilated and inculcated 
values of mutual respect, interdependence, the spirit of goodwill and peace 
among nations, and the benefits of development and economic growth, there 
would be a conscious disavowal of the call to arms, conflicts, and any ele-
ment that would otherwise disrupt peace among nations. It is this human-
centered approach to disarmament that this Article aims to understand and
resurrect. In doing so, this Part aims to understand the context leading up to 
these proposals.
B. Disarmament Movements Prior to the First World War
Prior to the First World War, states were already focusing on disarma-
ment. Kant’s 1797 essay Perpetual Peace was the first peace theory cover-
ing the actions of states.36 In a break from established norms, Victor Hugo 
and Giuseppe Garibaldi advocated peace as social justice and human rights 
30. Id. at 27–28. 
31. Id. at 27.
32. Id. at 27–28.
33. Id. at 28.
34. Id.
35. Id. 
36. POLITICAL AND CIVIC LEADERSHIP: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 174 (Richard A. 
Couto ed., 2010).
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rather than faith and religious virtue as it had been until then.37 The first 
peace societies were established in the 1800s.38 The American Peace Society 
was founded in 1828, and it focused on resolving international conflicts 
through reason and negotiation by promoting international dispute resolu-
tion through arbitration.39 The early peace movements also denounced the 
allocation of national human and economic resources toward war and the 
military, and they strongly criticized military spending.40 The first peace 
congress in Brussels in 1848 attracted participants from Belgium, France, 
Great Britain, Spain, and the United States. It was there that the first calls 
for disarmament were made.41 In 1849, almost 1,000 official delegates at-
tended the Paris Peace Conference, where the first call for a European union 
based on a democratic principle was made.42 In 1867, Geneva hosted the 
largest peace congress at the time, until the Paris exposition of 1889 went on 
to spawn the first universal peace congress.43
This first century of peace-building culminated in the Hague Peace 
Conferences of 1899 and 1907.44 The 1899 conference did not result in a 
significant decrease in arms,45 and the 1907 conference resulted in a “fee-
ble” resolution calling on the participating states to acknowledge and delib-
erate on the critical agenda of disarmament and arms control.46 Nonetheless, 
37. See id. at 175. 
38. Id. at 174.
39. Id.; see also DAVID CORTRIGHT, PEACE: A HISTORY OF MOVEMENTS AND IDEAS
28 (2008).
40. See CORTRIGHT, supra note 39, at 28; POLITICAL AND CIVIC LEADERSHIP: A
REFERENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 174.
41. See POLITICAL AND CIVIC LEADERSHIP: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 36,
at 175. However, what appears to have been overlooked by most commentators is that Chi-
nese feudal states during the Chun Chiu period (72–481 B.C.) held a multilateral disarmament 
conference in 546 B.C., over two millennia before any of these conferences, where they tried 
to remove arms and eliminate war. See generally RICHARD LOUIS WALKER, THE MULTI-
STATE SYSTEM OF ANCIENT CHINA 54–58 (1953); A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF ARMS 
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 5 (Trevor N. Dupuy & Gay M. Hammerman eds., 1973); Evan 
Morgan, A League of Nations in Ancient China, 57 J. NORTH CHINA BRANCH ROYAL ASIATIC 
SOC’Y 50 (1926). 
42. See POLITICAL AND CIVIC LEADERSHIP: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 36,
at 175.
43. See id. at 175–76.
44. Id. at 176.
45. See Detlev F. Vagts, The Hague Conventions and Arms Control, 94 AM. J. INT’L L.
31, 34 (2000); Geoffrey Best, Peace Conferences and the Century of Total War: The 1899 
Hague Conference and What Came After, 75 INT’L AFF. 619, 632 (1999); George H. Aldrich 
& Christine M. Chinkin, A Century of Achievement and Unfinished Work, 94 AM. J. INT’L L.
90, 92 (2000).
46. See Vagts, supra note 45, at 34. 
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the Hague Conferences “opened the doors—just barely—to the era of arms 
control.”47
C. Disarmament After the First World War
It is not a stretch to say that the world was eager to disarm after the First 
World War. The war-ravaged battlefields of the various theaters of the First 
World War had front row seats to the most massive scale of destruction the 
world had ever seen until then. They witnessed the changes surrounding tra-
ditional military strategy as the war drew to a close. The stage was set for 
calls to disarm. Of course, as discussed above, there already was some dis-
cussion of disarmament prior to the First World War. But the aftermath of 
the war was the catalyst for an environment open to global discussions and 
negotiations regarding the pursuit of the lofty goal of disarmament. This 
Section explores the disarmament debates after the First World War.
Post-World War I, disarmament efforts came to be perceived as vital to 
the maintenance and continuance of world peace. The peaceful settlement of 
disputes, security of states, and efforts to reduce or limit the level of arma-
ments in states around the world came to be known as the holy triumvirate 
of the disarmament efforts in the interwar period.48 Several attempts were 
made to get states to agree to reduce their weaponry and in some cases even 
abolish certain kinds of weapons.49 The following paragraphs provide a few 
examples.
The League of Nations was responsible for many of the initiatives to 
work toward peace in international relations.50 At the heart of the quest for 
peace and economic stability was the conundrum of disarmament.51 The 
First World War’s massive scale of destruction and its effect on economies 
and people all over the world caused public opinion to skew firmly against 
war and warmongering.52 Disarmament was the cynosure of all discussions 
in the public domain in the immediate aftermath of the war. It is no coinci-
dence that disarmament featured prominently on the agenda of the League 
of Nations and carved its place into Article 8 of the Covenant of the League 
47. Id. at 31 (explaining how the costs of increasing armaments were taking a toll on 
government budgets, and this was a primary reason for the Hague Conferences, but noting that 
the outcomes of the Conference related to qualitative aspects rather than curtailment of arms 
expenditure); see also Aldrich & Chinkin, supra note 45, at 90 (noting that one of the 
achievements of the Conferences was the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Interna-
tional Disputes; Best, supra note 45, at 628 (same). 
48. See Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Verbatim Record 
(Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting, at 4, League of Nations Doc. Conf. D./P.-V.1. (1) 
(1932), http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le000429.pdf.
49. See id. at 5–6.
50. See id. at 2.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 2, 7.
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of Nations.53 Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations states that, 
“the maintenance of peace required the reduction of national armaments to 
the lowest point consistent with (States’) national safety and the enforce-
ment by common action of their international obligations.”54 The Council of 
the League of Nations set up a Permanent Advisory Commission to handle 
disarmament as provided for under Article 8 of the Covenant.55
The first seed of the concept of moral disarmament sprouted at the first 
Assembly of the League, during which it was recognized that “disarmament 
was more than a technical question, and that, for its practical solution it was 
necessary to consider also a whole series of political, social and economic 
problems.”56 The recognition that disarmament was not to be merely con-
fined to material disarmament and the decision to widen the scope of en-
quiry and deliberations led to the creation of a Temporary Mixed Commis-
sion (the “TMC”).57 The TMC was composed of recognized authorities on 
the various aspects of disarmament requiring consideration.58 It deliberated 
for four years until the 1924 Assembly of the League.59 The discussions at 
the TMC focused “upon the necessarily intimate relation between disarma-
ment and security.”60 There was a school of thought that believed that dis-
armament “could only be effected in proportion to the development of secu-
rity” and another school of thought that firmly believed security for states 
was to be garnered as a consequence of disarmament.61 Walking the middle 
path between these two schools of thought, the TMC tried to bring about a 
compromise and proposed the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance to the As-
sembly of the League in 1923.62
The draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was the precursor to the Paris 
Pact for the Renunciation of War—also referred to as the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact—as the former was based on the idea that “war, as an instrument of 
aggression, must henceforth be regarded as an international crime.”63 The 
draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was not acceptable to the states as a final 
and satisfactory solution of the problem and was dropped by the Assembly 
53. See id. at 2.
54. League of Nations Covenant art. 8.
55. Verbatim Record (Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting, supra note 48, at 2.
56. See id. at 2.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Id.; see also GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 517–19 (5th ed. 1976) (discussing the relationship between 
these and other treaties); Mohammed M. Gomaa, The Definition of the Crime of Aggression 
and the ICC Jurisdiction over that Crime, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND 
THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 55, 62 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004) (same).
12 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 40:1
of the League in 1924, in lieu of “a more comprehensive plan, viz., the Ge-
neva Protocol of 192[5].”64 The 1925 Geneva Protocol overcame the diffi-
culties posed by the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and was accepted by 
fourteen states. However, it did not manage to obtain general acceptance 
because of “difficulties arising from the non-participation of important 
countries which were not members of the League of Nations.”65 Therefore, 
the Geneva Protocol was set aside in favor of a partial application of a re-
gional system of guarantees, which came to be referred to as the Locarno 
Agreements of October 16, 1925.66 It can be said that the Locarno Agree-
ments also contributed to the idea of moral disarmament. The representa-
tives of the eight signatory states were firmly convinced that
the entry into force of these treaties and conventions would con-
tribute greatly to bring about a moral relaxation of international 
tension, help powerfully towards the solution of many political and 
economic problems in accordance with the interests and sentiments 
of the peoples concerned and would thus effectively hasten the dis-
armament provided for in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League.67
The General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes—consisting of three 
conventions dealing with conciliation, judicial settlement, and arbitral set-
tlement—was presented to the Assembly of the League in 1928 and came 
into effect on August 16, 1929.68 In 1930, the Assembly of the League 
adopted the Convention on Financial Assistance.69 The next development in 
promoting disarmament talks was that a majority of states of the League ac-
cepted the Permanent Court of International Justice’s compulsory jurisdic-
tion.70 The Committee on Arbitration and Security, which was set up by the 
Preparatory Commission in accordance with a resolution adopted by the As-
sembly of the League at its 8th session in September 1927, proposed a
framework whereby “security provided in the General Act would be sup-
64. Verbatim Record (Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting, supra note 48, at 3.
65. Id. There is a similar problem currently facing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
and the Chemical Weapons Convention, where major states in these areas remain outside of 
these regimes.
66. See id.; see also Werner Morvay, Locarno Treaties (1925), in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 330 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1981).
67. Verbatim Record (Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting, supra note 48, at 4.
68. See id. (noting that the General Act was accepted by nineteen States and represents 
one of the most considerable efforts in the task of peace building in the period after the First
World War); see also Quincy Wright, The General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Interna-
tional Disputes, 24 AM. J. INT’L L. 582, 582 (1930).
69. See Verbatim Record (Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting, supra note 48, at 4–5
(noting that the enforcement of the Convention on Financial Assistance was conditional “on
the entry into force of a scheme for the reduction of armaments” and that was accepted by 
thirty states).
70. See id.
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plemented by a draft Convention to improve the Means of preventing War,” 
which the Assembly adopted in 1931.71
A brief mention must be made about the efforts regarding naval dis-
armament.72 The Washington Conferences of 1921 and 1922 resulted in a 
Five-Power Treaty (United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Ja-
pan) that limited capital ships and aircraft carriers.73 A naval conference was 
held in Geneva in 1927, but the deliberations did not lead to any successful 
outcome.74 However, the London Naval Conference in 1930 was more suc-
cessful and resulted in an agreement between the United States, the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, and Japan “to dispose certain existing capital 
ships . . . and limit their cruisers, destroyers and submarines to given defi-
nite figures.”75
In parallel efforts to promote disarmament and peace, the most im-
portant advancement in the disarmament and security context outside the 
realm of the League was “the adoption of the Paris Pact for the Renuncia-
tion of War as an Instrument of National Policy.”76 In order to harmonize 
the Paris Pact with the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Assembly of 
the League inserted into the Covenant a prohibition of war and an affirma-
tion that international disputes had to be resolved through pacific means.77
Thus, disarmament efforts in the interwar period were clearly consid-
ered important by states that wished to work toward rebuilding economies 
and establishing peace. It also is clear from the above that states made sev-
eral efforts toward disarmament in the period after the First World War.
D. Preparation for the Disarmament Conference
In the aftermath of the First World War, the developments highlighted 
above were slowly adding momentum and setting the stage for the Dis-
armament Conference. In the build-up to the Disarmament Conference, a 
Preparatory Commission was set up to conduct massive deliberations,78 as 
well as to lay the groundwork for the Conference, where the triple objec-
tives inspiring League members’ efforts were arbitration, security, and dis-
armament.79 Guarantees of security and arbitration were considered im-
71. Id.
72. See id. at 5–6.
73. See id. at 5.
74. See id. 
75. Id.; see also L.P. Morgan, The Background of the London Naval Conference, with 
Comparative Statistics on the Five Navies Illustrated by Tables and Charts (1930).
76. Verbatim Record (Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting, supra note 48, at 5. 
77. See id. (the Assembly of the League adopted, in 1927, a resolution “in favor of a 
complete renunciation of war”). 
78. See id. at 4 (stating that the “bulk of the work of the Preparatory Commission was 
of a technical character” and also included questions related to “security and provision of pa-
cific settlement of disputes”). 
79. See id. 
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portant factors to negotiate a fixed level of armaments in accordance with 
the terms of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League.80 The Preparatory 
Commission sessions built up expectations that, as states started to 
acknowledge the growth of security in international relations, the agreement 
to decrease arms would increase.81 The Preparatory Commission constituted 
two special sub-commissions for the study of the questions relating to dis-
armament—one for deliberations regarding the military, naval, and air as-
pects and the other related to the non-military aspects.82
The Preparatory Commission deliberated for five years and prepared a 
draft of the Convention for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments in 
December 1930.83 The draft Convention prescribed a framework and meth-
ods to achieve disarmament.84 There was no provision regarding moral dis-
armament in the draft Convention of the Preparatory Commission. The Pre-
paratory Commission finished its work in December 1930, and the League 
of Nations started preparing for the Disarmament Conference.85 In the run-
up to the Disarmament Conference, the Assembly of the League appealed to 
all the states to spare no effort to “create a world opinion strong enough to 
enable [the] Conference to achieve positive results.”86 An armaments truce 
was recommended with the object of “preventing competition in armaments 
pending the conclusion” of the Disarmament Conference.87 The Armaments 
Truce was “accepted for one year from November 1st, 1931,” by the gov-
80. See Report by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, at 32, 
League of Nations Doc. C.690.M.289.1930.IX.[(C.P.D.295(I)] (1930), http://
digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le00030a.pdf.
81. See id. at 34; see also Records of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitations 
of Armaments, League of Nations (1932) (showing that the Preparatory Commission held six 
sessions, two in 1926, two in 1927, one in 1928, and the sixth session began in April 1929, 
was suspended in May 1929, resumed in November 1930 and continued until December 
1930).
82. See Report by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, supra
note 80, at 32.
83. See Verbatim Record (Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting of the Conference,
supra note 48, at 5.
84. See id. at 5–6 (noting how some of the questions dealt with in the draft Convention 
were the “limitation of effectives in time of peace and the limitation of the period of service in 
conscript armies, the indirect limitation of land material by means of a limitation of expendi-
ture, the direct limitation of tonnage and gun caliber of naval material, the limitation of ex-
penditure on material for naval armaments, the limitation of the total number, horse power and 
volume of dirigibles, the limitation of the total number and horse power of aeroplanes, the 
limitation of the total annual expenditure on land, sea and air armed forces and formations 
organized on a military basis, publicity and exchange of information, the prohibition of the 
use of chemical and bacteriological arms, the creation of a permanent disarmament commis-
sion, and finally the procedure to be followed in dealing with complaints.”).
85. See id. at 6.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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ernments taking part in the Disarmament Conference.”88 The Armaments 
Truce was later renewed for a period of four months.89 The Armaments 
Truce and its renewal bear witness to the sincere intentions of the govern-
ments to deliberate and arrive at a mutually beneficial reduction of world 
armaments.90 The detailed deliberations of the Preparatory Commission thus 
paved the way for comprehensive negotiations and discussions at the Dis-
armament Conference.
E. Immediately Before the Disarmament Conference
At the threshold of the Disarmament Conference, the “two great safe-
guards against acts of violence and war” were the Covenant of the League 
of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.91 The Disarmament Conference 
was convened “to deal with the whole problem of the reduction and limita-
tion of armaments under Article 8 of the Covenant of the League” and to 
deliberate on definite steps toward achieving and maintaining peace.92 The 
Disarmament Conference was considered unique because states who were 
not members of the League of Nations also were to participate in the im-
portant quest to reduce the world’s armaments.93 This stands in contrast with 
current practice within the International Atomic Energy Agency (the 
“IAEA”), for example, where non-member states can attend and participate 
in IAEA conferences only if they are UN members or members of a UN 
88. Id.
89. See Armaments Truce (Renewal), supra note 25.
90. The Albanian government accepted the Armaments Truce and stated its desire “of 
seeing the ideals of peace and justice on which the Covenant is based firmly established 
throughout the world and of helping to prepare the ground for the success of the coming Con-
ference.” See Conference for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments, Armaments Truce,
at 6, League of Nations Doc. C919.M.484.1931.IX.[Conf.D.35.]. The German government 
expressed its willingness to support “all measures which might facilitate the work of the Dis-
armament Conference” in its acceptance of the Armaments Truce. Id. at 7. The Australian 
government stated in its acceptance of the Armaments Truce that it was convinced that “the 
success of the Disarmament Conference would be greatly promoted” by the armaments truce.
Id. The Bulgarian government confirmed its acceptance of the renewal of the Armaments 
Truce stating expressly that it was prepared “to adhere to any measure likely to bring about 
the effective reduction of the armaments of all States.” Id. The Lithuanian government set out 
its conviction that the truce would “greatly contribute to the success of the General Disarma-
ment Conference[.]” Id. at 14. 
91. See Verbatim Record (Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting, supra note 48, at 1.
92. Id. at 7 (stating that the agenda for the Disarmament Conference could be divided 
into three tasks: “(a) to arrive at a collective agreement on an effective programme of practical 
proposals speedily to secure a substantial reduction and limitation of all national armaments; 
(b) to determine that no armaments may be maintained outside the scope of that treaty by 
which all nations represented (at the Conference) are to make the achievement of universal 
disarmament their common aim; (c) to ensure continuity of advance towards our ultimate 
goal, without detracting in any way from the fullest measure of success of our immediate ef-
fort, by planning the holding of similar conferences at reasonably short intervals of time”). 
93. Id. at 1. 
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specialized agency.94 Sixty states were represented at the Disarmament Con-
ference, which was called “the most important international gathering since 
the termination of the world war in 1918.”95
Thus, there were many developments related to disarmament in the pe-
riod after the First World War leading up to the Disarmament Conference. 
The majority of the discussions centered around the principles of security, 
arbitration, and material disarmament. There was, however, a parallel 
movement of thought regarding another feature of disarmament—that of 
moral disarmament. Throughout the interwar period, the concept of moral 
disarmament was discussed in circles of intellectual cooperation. It was also 
taken up by certain interested states who wished to broaden the perspective 
of the deliberators at various fora of discussion relating to disarmament. 
While material disarmament was a finite concept, easy to understand and 
easy to convert into numerical figures—even if not as easy to achieve—
moral disarmament was, as a concept, intangible and therefore more diffi-
cult to elucidate. The next Part looks at all instances and references to moral 
disarmament as developed during the interwar period.
III. Moral Disarmament in the 1932 Disarmament Conference
During the deliberations at the Disarmament Conference, the principle 
of moral disarmament quickly generated considerable international support. 
Various documents and records of discussions during and leading up to the 
1932 Disarmament Conference reveal that the Polish delegation was an ac-
tive contributor to the agenda of moral disarmament. Other champions of 
the cause of moral disarmament include the International Organization on 
Intellectual Cooperation, the International Committee on Intellectual Coop-
eration, and various National Committees on Intellectual Cooperation.96
Moreover, at various occasions in 1931, delegates of the French, British, 
and Spanish governments made statements regarding moral disarmament.97
Moral disarmament also found expression in international associations like 
the International Federation of League of Nations Societies and the World 
94. See Paul C. Szasz, The Law and Practices of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency 128–29 (1970) (citing Procedural Rule 30). 
95. Verbatim Record (Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting, supra note 48, at 1.
96. See Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Moral Disarma-
ment: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International Organisation on Intellectual Co-
operation, at 6–8, League of Nations Doc. Conf. D. 98 (1932), http://
digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le000079.pdf.
97. See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, at 1, League 
of Nations Doc. C.602.M.240.1931.IX [Conf. D.I6] (1931), http://digital.library.northwestern.
edu/league/le000080.pdf. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to moral disarma-
ment at “the tenth session of the League Assembly . . . .” Id. The British Foreign Minister 
made a similar reference at “the annual meeting of the Burge Memorial Trust . . . .” Id. (inter-
nal quotations omitted). The Spanish delegation made references to moral disarmament at “the 
twelfth session of the Assembly . . . .” Id. 
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Peace League.98 The International Federation of the League of Nations So-
cieties, at its fifteenth plenary Congress, voiced its consideration that any 
progress in moral disarmament would proceed from the rejection of “belli-
cose or aggressive propaganda.” It adopted a resolution seeking to develop 
practices in the sphere of journalism and the Press to reinforce commitment 
to the values of moral disarmament.99
The Disarmament Committee of the Women’s International Organiza-
tions considered that “moral hostility,” above all, “was a grave menace” to 
world peace and lent the moral disarmament movement their full support, 
having worked for several years to achieve its principles.100 Another contri-
bution to the growing awareness of moral disarmament came from the Uni-
versal Peace Congress in July 1931.101 The Universal Peace Congress main-
tained that moral disarmament was crucial in achieving material 
disarmament, as moral disarmament was “at the same time the condition 
and the guarantee of all reduction of military armaments.”102 A much-valued 
contribution came from an appeal made by the Conference of Press Experts, 
which was aimed at the network of press and journalists around the world 
and sought collaboration and contributions from the press in its efforts to-
ward peace, harmony, and goodwill among states and their peoples.103 The 
following paragraphs describe the various initiatives taken with regard to 
moral disarmament and also integrate the efforts made in the fields of intel-
lectual cooperation that are pertinent to disarmament. Scrutiny of the delib-
erations made by the Committee for Moral Disarmament draws attention to 
the various indicators that were considered important for achieving moral 
disarmament. The framework discussed by the Committee for achieving 
moral disarmament and the support professed by various states in this re-
gard are described in detail in this Section.
A. The Polish Initiative on Moral Disarmament
The Polish delegation contributed to the principle of moral disarmament 
through statements at the last session of the Preparatory Commission for the 
Disarmament Conference, discussions in the Special Committee appointed 
98. Id.
99. Id. at 4.
100. See Communication on “Moral Disarmament” by the Disarmament Committee of 
the Women’s International Organisations to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation 
of Armaments, at 1, League of Nations Doc. 7A/36301/31255 (1932), http://
libraryresources.unog.ch/ld.php?content_id=19934112.
101. See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note 
97, at 4.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 5 (noting that the Conference of Press Experts adopted a resolution on Moral 
Disarmament wherein it appealed to “the Press of the world to contribute by every means at 
its disposal to the consolidation of peace, to combat hatred between nationalities and between 
classes,” as these factors posed the greatest danger to international peace). 
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to deliberate on and prepare a draft General Convention “for strengthening 
the [m]eans of preventing [w]ar,” and detailed memoranda on the subject of 
moral disarmament.104 This Section discusses three documents—the Polish 
memorandum of September 1931, the proposals of February 1932, and the 
proposals of March 15, 1932—that highlight the contributions of the Polish 
delegation to achieving moral disarmament.105
The Polish memorandum of September 1931 set out suggestions to 
achieve moral disarmament in various spheres of government and civil 
life.106 Moral disarmament was not a principle that could be put into practice 
and display results immediately; rather, it was a process that would give de-
sirable results on a progressive inculcation of its values as it slowly but 
firmly, and even unconsciously, permeated into every aspect of public life. 
Moral disarmament could be put into practice in governmental spheres of 
public works, international relations, and domestic legislation, and in public 
spheres of education, broadcasting, press, cinema, and other intellectual co-
operation activities.107 Some of the recommendations in the memorandum 
related to national legislation, problems of the press, systemic changes in 
education, and broadcasting.108
The proposals of February 1932 elaborated on suggestions of the mem-
orandum in an effort to facilitate “achieving of moral disarmament in every 
field of public life controlled by the organs of government.”109 These efforts 
were driven by the firm conviction that harmony in international relations 
would inspire and cultivate mutual confidence and respect among states and 
their peoples. This, in turn, would be a step toward maintaining peace and 
thus a gradual attainment of disarmament.110 As a result, it was vital to con-
vert governments to the cause of moral disarmament and to use a top-down 
approach to integrate aspects of moral disarmament into their foreign poli-
cies and international relationships.111 The contribution of governments to 
104. Id. at 1.
105. See id.; see also Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Pro-
posals of the Polish Delegation with Regard to the Gradual Attainment of Moral Disarma-
ment, League of Nations Doc. Conf.D.76 (1932), http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/
league/le000107.pdf; Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Prelimi-
nary Report of the Work of the Conference, at 143, League of Nations Doc. Conf.D.171(I) 
(1936), http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le00089a.pdf.
106. See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note 
97, at 2–3.
107. Id. (emphasizing that “one of the ways to achieve a progressive realization of dis-
armament was through a practical achievement of moral disarmament” in various spheres like 
education, press, broadcasting and cinema, and legislation). 
108. Id. at 2, 3, 5.
109. See id. at 1.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 2.
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this cause was crucial.112 If international relations between governments did 
not encompass qualities of mutual respect, tolerance, and peaceful resolu-
tion of disputes, inter alia, then it would be improbable—if not impossi-
ble—to expect the principles of moral disarmament to seep into various fea-
tures of public life.113
The Polish proposals of March 15, 1932 on moral disarmament made 
recommendations in respect of legislation, press, and broadcasting.114 They 
sought to stretch domestic law to certain actions that would be considered 
“incompatible with satisfactory international relations and dangerous to the
peace of the world.”115 Suggestions were put forward for the gradual 
achievement of moral disarmament through channels of the press116 and 
through broadcasting.117 The importance of the contribution of the Polish 
delegation in the field of moral disarmament is evident from the discussion 
in the following sections. The suggestions put forward by the Polish delega-
tion also find parallels in the deliberations of the International Organization 
on Intellectual Cooperation.
B. Intellectual Cooperation and Moral Disarmament
In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, the League of Na-
tions considered it important to promote intellectual activities and to seek 
cooperation with regard to various fields comprising intellectual activity, 
with the goal of promoting international cooperation and international intel-
112. See Communication on “Moral Disarmament” by the Disarmament Committee of 
the Women’s International Organisations to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation 
of Armaments, supra note 100, at 1 (beseeching all governments to “take necessary steps to 
guard the school, the book, the press, the radio, the cinema, and all public platforms, from 
pernicious influences working against peace”).
113. See Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference, supra note 105, at 143 (stat-
ing that the “International Policy of Governments should be in harmony with their efforts in 
the direction of moral disarmament”); Proposals of the Polish Delegation with Regard to the 
Gradual Attainment of Moral Disarmament, supra note 105, at 2.
114. See Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference, supra note 105, at 143.
115. See id. at 143 (noting that a suggestion was made to conclude an international con-
vention where “Governments would agree to make certain specified actions punishable of-
fences under their law, such actions to be defined as incompatible with satisfactory interna-
tional relations and dangerous to the peace of the world. These actions would include inciting 
public opinion to warlike sentiments, propaganda which aimed at inducing States to violate 
international law, and the deliberate spreading of false or distorted reports or forged docu-
ments likely to embitter the relations between States.”).
116. See id. at 143 (noting that a recommendation was made that “[a] conference should 
be held . . . of qualified representatives of journalists and publishers’ associations to consider 
what steps could be taken to put the idea of moral disarmament into effect so far as the Press 
was concerned.”). 
117. Id. at 143 (noting that a recommendation was made to have a General Convention 
on broadcasting, and it was suggested that governments “undertake[] to adhere to the principle 
of moral disarmament in their supervision of broadcasting programmes.”). 
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lectual collaboration.118 The result was the International Organization on In-
tellectual Cooperation,119 which was one of the League of Nations’ four 
technical entities.120 The purpose of intellectual collaboration and coopera-
tion was to create “an atmosphere favourable to the pacific solution of inter-
national problems.”121 Intellectual cooperation was seen as a definite method 
of encouraging participation and collaboration between states “in all fields 
of intellectual effort” in order “to promote a spirit of international under-
standing as a means to the preservation of peace.”122 These principles were 
also the basis of the concept of moral disarmament. The International Or-
ganization on Intellectual Cooperation made several valuable contributions 
to the field of moral disarmament, especially in the fields of education, in-
ternational collaboration, international relations, broadcasting, cinema, and 
the press.123 The intellectual cooperation movement found many common 
factors with the agenda of the Polish delegation in the field of moral dis-
armament and these commonalities were discussed by the Committee for 
Moral Disarmament.
C. The Committee for Moral Disarmament
The methods of achieving moral disarmament were deliberated on by 
delegations at the Disarmament Conference and in parallel by the Interna-
tional Organization on Intellectual Cooperation and other associations. The 
delegations at the Disarmament Conference were convinced of the necessity 
of carefully examining all proposals regarding moral disarmament and to 
pursue a method of transforming the theory into practice. To achieve these 
ends, a Committee for Moral Disarmament came into being on March 15, 
1932 at the meeting of the Political Commission of the Disarmament Con-
ference.124 The memoranda submitted by the Polish Government to the Po-
118. See Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International 
Organisation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 5–6.
119. See id. at 6 (noting that the International Organization on Intellectual Co-operation 
was created in 1926 and consists of an International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation,
three permanent institutions, viz., an Intellectual Co-operation Section in the League Secretar-
iat, an International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation at Paris and an International Educa-
tional Cinematographic Institute in Rome, thirty-nine national committees, and a large number 
of committees of experts).
120. See id. at 5.
121. Id. at 6 (italicized in original).
122. Id. (italicized in original).
123. See id. at 7 (noting that, due to the large interconnected network of the Intellectual 
Co-operation Organization, “[i]deas of interest to contemporary civili[z]ation or which tend to 
promote international collaboration in instruction and education may thus pass in a short space 
of time from a national proposal to an international reality[,]” and in addition, “rapid co-
operation of various countries with the League of Nations is ensured . . . .”). 
124. See Report of the Committee for Moral Disarmament at the End of the First Session 
of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, at 1, League of Nations 
Doc. Conf.D.138.[Conf. D./C.D.M.24.] (1932), http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/
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litical Commission of the Disarmament Conference played an important 
role in the establishment of the Committee for Moral Disarmament.125 The 
memoranda drew the attention of the Commission to the obvious connection 
between material and moral disarmament.126
A sub-committee was appointed to examine the various factors that 
connected material and moral disarmament and to prepare an agenda for de-
liberation by the Committee for Moral Disarmament.127 The agenda for the 
work of the Committee for Moral Disarmament was prepared in accordance 
with the recommendations made by the Committee on Intellectual Coopera-
tion, and suggestions were put forward by certain delegations.128 The agenda 
of the Committee for Moral Disarmament categorized the various aspects 
linking material and moral disarmament into three headings:
? Questions concerning intellectual cooperation and technical 
means of spreading information, including the problems of ed-
ucation, utilization of cinematography, and broadcasting;
? Questions concerning the cooperation of the Press; and
? Questions of a legal character.129
Sub-committees were appointed to deliberate on the various aspects related 
to each of the above headings.130 The Committee for Moral Disarmament 
adopted a resolution on June 2, 1933, stating that provisions regarding mor-
al disarmament “should stand on the same footing as provisions regarding 
material disarmament in the final texts to be adopted by the Conference.”131
The Committee for Moral Disarmament went on to adopt a draft text pre-
pared by the International Organization on Intellectual Cooperation as a ba-
sis for discussion of the first group of “questions concerning intellectual co-
operation and technical means of spreading information, including the prob-
le000078.pdf (noting that the Committee had M. Perrier (Switzerland) as President and M. 
Szumlakowski (Poland) as Rapporteur).
125. See id. at 1 (noting that the Polish memorandum and proposals were created on 
September 23, 1931, February 13, 1932, and March 15, 1932).
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 2 (noting that the sub-committee for questions concerning intellectual co-
operation based its deliberations on data, suggestions and recommendations from “the Orga-
ni[z]ation on Intellectual Co-operation and the Rome International Educational Cinemato-
graphic Institute, and . . . several delegations.”); Preliminary Report of the Work of the Con-
ference, supra note 105, at 144 (noting that the Committee appointed a Legal Committee to 
study the legal and constitutional questions involved in the problem of moral disarmament and 
a memorandum submitted on the subject by M. Pella (Romania)). 
131. See Letter Addressed to the President of the Conference by the Chairman of the 
Moral Disarmament Committee December 1, 1933, at 932, League of Nations Doc. Conf.D/
C.D.M.38 (1932), http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le00032e.pdf.
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lems of education, utilization of the cinematography and broadcasting.”132
The text had four articles and a short preamble.133 The draft text considered 
issues relating to the “education of the younger generation, co-operation of 
the intellectual world, utilization of technical means of spreading infor-
mation, and ways and means of giving effect to possible undertakings.” It 
also sought to provide a framework that would facilitate moral disarmament 
in all discussed areas.134
The Committee for Moral Disarmament forwarded this text135 to the 
President of the Conference on December 1, 1933.136 At the same time, the 
Chairman of the Committee for Moral Disarmament informed the President 
of the Conference that the questions related to legislation and cooperation of 
the press would be considered by the Committee at a later stage of the Con-
ference.137 The Chairman also communicated that the Committee would 
keep on hold the procedures arrived at for the implementation of moral dis-
armament until the Conference arrived at procedures to execute the imple-
mentation of material disarmament.138 The United Kingdom and a few other 
132. See Report on the Work of the Committee for Moral Disarmament, at 928, League 
of Nations Doc. D./C.D.M.37 (1933), http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/
le00032e.pdf (showing how three texts were at the disposal of the Committee for deliberations 
regarding the first group of questions, including questions related to teaching, co-operation 
between intellectual circles, broadcasting, theatre and the cinematograph; noting that one was 
a draft framed by the Rapporteur of the Committee in June 1932, one was the draft submitted
by the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation and the third draft was one sub-
mitted to the Committee by the British and United States delegations; showing that ideas 
emerged from a comparison of the texts led the French delegation to present a compromise 
draft, which was finally adopted as a basis for discussion; noting how the Assembly of the 
League of Nations at its fourteenth session “stressed the value of the draft text relating to 
Moral Disarmament which had been framed by the International Committee on Intellectual 
Co-operation.”). 
133. See Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference, supra note 105, at 144.
134. See Report of the Committee for Moral Disarmament at the End of the First Session 
of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, supra note 124, at 2.
135. See Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference, supra note 105, at 144 
(pointing out that the draft was submitted with reservations, with one reservation being sub-
mitted by the Hungarian delegation but it concerned the form and not the content of the text, 
with the reservation being stated in the Minutes of the nineteenth meeting held on November 
17, 1933); Report on the Work of the Committee for Moral Disarmament, supra note 132, at 
928. 
136. See Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference, supra note 105, at 144 
(showing that the text had been “revised by the International Committee on Intellectual Co-
operation in July 1933, and further amended by the Committee on Moral Disarmament in Oc-
tober and November 1933.”); Report on the Work of the Committee for Moral Disarmament,
supra note 132, at 928 (showing that the task of drafting a new text was entrusted to a Draft-
ing Committee consisting of the Chairman of the Committee for Moral Disarmament and M. 
Komarnicki, Rapporteur, inter alia). 
137. See Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference, supra note 105, at 145.
138. See Letter Addressed to the President of the Conference by the Chairman of the 
Moral Disarmament Committee Dated December 1, 1933, supra note 131, at 932 (showing 
that the Committee had agreed on procedures of implementation of moral disarmament for the 
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delegations voted in favor of the draft text, but stated that they might later 
wish to present further observations with regard to the substance or form of 
the new draft.139 In view of such observations, the delegates pointed out that 
the text was not finally binding and reserved the right to consult their na-
tional administrations.140 Even though the draft was not considered to be 
binding, a framework to incorporate principles of moral disarmament in 
everyday life took distinct shape through the deliberations of the Committee 
for Moral Disarmament. The Committee also deliberated on methods to 
achieve moral disarmament in various spheres of public life, discussed in 
the next Section.
D. Achieving Moral Disarmament
The various proposals and the draft text adopted by the Committee for 
Moral Disarmament reveal that the spheres most conducive to the achieve-
ment of moral disarmament were education, intellectual collaboration, legis-
lation, press, broadcasting, and cinema. Each of these spheres is examined 
in detail in the following sub-Sections.
1. Education and Moral Disarmament
Education has far-reaching consequences that impact many genera-
tions.141 There is no better way to plant the seeds of peace, brotherhood, 
non-violence, harmonious existence, and tolerance than in the fertile minds 
of young people through a nurturing system of education.142 As such, it was 
proposed to achieve moral disarmament through educational reform. It was 
important to protect the young from hostile inclinations toward foreign
states and their peoples.143 The entire framework of education had to be as-
sessed to ensure that the principles of moral disarmament would be fol-
lowed in every aspect of educating the public. Recommendations144 were 
made with respect to every aspect of the educational system, including cur-
ricula, syllabi, school textbooks, teacher training, university courses, and 
first group of questions and that such procedures would include “the question of periodic re-
ports on the progress of the work of moral disarmament, methods of addressing complaints 
and action to be taken concerning them, and the organ to be set up for the receipt and publica-
tion of reports and complaints.”).
139. See Report on the Work of the Committee for Moral Disarmament, supra note 132,
at 928.
140. See id.
141. See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note 
97, at 3.
142. See id. at 3.
143. See id.
144. See id. (noting that the Polish delegation made a few recommendations on the sub-
ject of education and that the sub-committee of experts of the International Committee of In-
tellectual Co-operation also provided recommendations on the subject of education).
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civil service examination subjects.145 Recommendations made in respect of 
each of these aspects are discussed in detail below.
a.  Teacher Training
It was considered equally, if not more, important to ensure that the atti-
tudes of teachers reflected the principles of moral disarmament in every as-
pect of their interactions with their students.146 Educational institutions were 
seen as the place where young and impressionable minds would internalize 
the principles they were taught. This made the students vulnerable to indoc-
trination if their teachers expressed negative attitudes regarding foreign 
states or people.147 Such negative impressions had to be avoided if moral 
disarmament was to have any chance of influencing the minds of students. 
Therefore, it was considered crucial to create suitable training programs for 
teachers and educators to adopt the attitudes needed to pass on the principles 
of moral disarmament to their students.
b. Instruction in Matters of the League
The importance of cultivating a broad, international perspective among 
the young was regarded as conducive to creating an awareness that “interna-
tional co-operation was the normal method of conducting world affairs.”148
It is pertinent to mention that the Assembly of the League made recommen-
dations to its member states “to arrange for the youth in their countries to be 
made aware of the aims of the league.”149 To further this international per-
145. See Moral Disarmament: Correspondence with Dr. James T. Shotwell, League of 
Nations Doc. 7A/652/652 (1933), https://libraryresources.unog.ch/ld.php?content_id=
31291829 (regarding Moral Disarmament) (noting how the proposal regarding examinations 
for government positions was adopted from the American proposal regarding education and 
intellectual co-operation); Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government,
supra note 97.
146. See Moral Disarmament: Correspondence with Dr. James T. Shotwell, supra note 
145.
147. See id.
148. Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International Organ-
isation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 7 (noting how the International Organi-
zation on Intellectual Co-operation pointed out that in 1923 the Assembly of the League of 
Nations “considered the question of training the younger generation to regard international co-
operation as the normal method of conducting world affairs”). 
149. Id. at 8 (noting how an experts sub-committee was included in the International 
Committee of Intellectual Co-operation and how recommendations were made regarding in-
struction of youth in matters of the League, including the “introduction of compulsory instruc-
tion in regard to the League, elimination of content prejudicial to mutual understanding be-
tween nations, from school text-books, educational measures to enable young people to 
acquire a better understanding of foreign nations and to instill in them the ideals of interna-
tional co-operation,” with the Committee also referring to the work undertaken by “the Con-
ference of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations in connection with 
the Sub-Committee of Experts for instruction in the aims of the League”). 
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spective, recommendations were made to install “compulsory instruction in 
all schools in regard to the work and aims of the League of Nations and 
matters of development of international co-operation.”150 In addition, there 
was a proposal to install “special League of Nations chairs in faculties of 
law.”151 It was considered necessary to implement such measures on an in-
ternational basis. A recommendation was made to bind governments under 
an international convention to curtail “elements of hatred” and negativity in
international relations and to create awareness of the ideas of the League of 
Nations in all manifestations of school instruction.152 Creating awareness 
about the League of Nations and its principles and framework regarding in-
ternational relations and peace was seen as a stepping-stone for young peo-
ple to internalize principles of peace, understanding, and tolerance.153 In or-
der to further such awareness, reformers proposed establishing a 
“documentation section” dealing with the League and aspects of interna-
tional relations in all the “different national [education] centres.”154
c.  Revision of School Textbooks
The International Organization on Intellectual Cooperation considered 
that a significant positive step toward the realization of moral disarmament 
could be taken by revising school textbooks with regard to all material that 
was “capable of arousing hatred of foreigners,” their communities, and any 
material that would go against the development of international peace and 
mutual respect.155 Such revision would be conducive to the maintenance of 
mutual respect, tolerance, and international peace and harmony.156 In the 
process of reviewing the textbooks for revision of material that could cause 
ill-will, reformers also encouraged states to consider improving the content 
of school textbooks.157 Such improvements would include revision of con-
tent injurious to peaceful international relations and mutual understanding, 
150. See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note 
97, at 3 (noting how it was recommended that the educational system “be equipped to provide 
such training at all stages of school life” and how a proposal to create suitable documentary 
material to “help train teachers and through them to impart the principles to the students” was 
suggested). 
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International Organ-
isation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 9 (noting how this was a collaboration 
between “Musées pédagogiques (collections of teaching material) and directors of primary 
education . . . .”). 
155. Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note 97, at 
3; see also Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International Or-
ganisation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 8.
156. See Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International 
Organisation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 2–3, 9.
157. See id. at 3.
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methods “to reconcile historical truth with goodwill towards foreign na-
tions[,]” presentation of the truth without causing ill-will toward another 
state, and relating the history of one state with reference to the international 
context.158
d. Intellectual Collaboration and International Relations
The International Organization on Intellectual Cooperation recom-
mended strengthening intellectual cooperation between various societies of 
intellectual activity in its efforts to bring about moral disarmament.159 Inter-
national relations in the aftermath of the First World War dealt with prob-
lems of a “political, economic, legal, social and historical nature created by 
the war . . . .”160 These problems gave rise to a need for new methods of in-
struction to provide guidance in navigating them.161 In the period following 
the First World War, “many new chairs were founded in Universities, new 
study centres, both national and international, and centres of instruction and 
research were set up in nearly every country[,]” and there was a common 
focus on the study of “international affairs . . . .”162
The International Organization on Intellectual Cooperation was suc-
cessful in achieving an interactive collaboration between distinguished cen-
ters of academic excellence through the establishment of an annual confer-
ence starting in 1928.163 This collaboration was an excellent example of 
cultivating intellectual networks for circulating the principle of moral dis-
armament among academics from all over the world.164 The annual confer-
ence was very successful, and one of the outcomes was a large intercon-
nected network for “the exchange of information, publications and 
bibliograph[ies] . . . .”165 The network enabled a continuous flow of infor-
mation between educational centers in different countries, thus “facilitating 
the task of professors and students and establishing intercourse between na-
tional institutions hitherto unacquainted with each other.”166 The conference 
also contributed to moral disarmament by engaging in scientific research 
and discussions on contemporary issues of international relations.167
158. Id. at 9.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 10.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id. (noting how the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, in March 
1928, convened a conference for the purpose of assisting with collaboration of the academic 
work of the “most distinguished representatives of national centres for advanced international 
studies” in Berlin). 
164. See id. at 10–11.
165. Id. at 10.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 11 (noting an observation at the conference convened by the International 
Institute of Intellectual Co-operation that this “new (scientific and not political) method of 
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Again, all of this was done in the name of disarmament. These confer-
ences also highlighted the Organization’s willingness to walk the path of 
moral disarmament by engaging with the public and explaining “the differ-
ent national points of view in regard to the problems raised by the Confer-
ence for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments . . . .”168 Other recom-
mendations related to pursuing moral disarmament through cultivation of 
international intellectual collaborations included affiliations between stu-
dents and teachers of different countries,169 an organization of international 
school exhibitions, an exchange system for international books and bibliog-
raphies,170 and continuous international collaboration in primary and sec-
ondary school education through exchange of information, gramophone 
records, films, foreign visits, and study scholarships in foreign countries.171
Suggestions made in respect of furthering the principle of moral dis-
armament were not in vain, as can be seen from the efforts taken by states to 
implement and put the recommendations into practice. In working toward 
moral disarmament, states placed particular emphasis on education during 
the interwar period. In particular, some of the implementation efforts in-
cluded: (a) setting up an educational information center for coordination of 
the work,172 publication of biannual educational surveys, and publication 
and translation of a book on the League for teachers and educators,173 (b) in-
troducing instruction regarding the League’s aims and ideals into primary 
and secondary schools’ curricula,174 (c) institution of lectures and electives 
in international relations and government publication of manuals relating to 
the League and international relations,175 (d) revision of school textbooks in 
study and discussion on the international plane, based on documentation of a national charac-
ter, systematically collected and arranged” could prove to be very relevant to the work of 
achieving moral disarmament). 
168. Id. at 11.
169. See Proposals of the Polish Delegation with Regard to the Gradual Attainment of 
Moral Disarmament, supra note 105, at 2 (suggesting that affiliations between students and 
teachers of different countries would definitely contribute toward the ideal that international 
peace is the only pathway to the future). 
170. See Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International 
Organisation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 9 (noting how a service for “the 
exchange of works and bibliographies concerning international questions and books describ-
ing the life and characteristics of the different nations” also was proposed). 
171. See id. at 4.
172. Id. at 8. 
173. See id. (noting that a book on the “aims and organization of the League, specifically 
intended for members of the teaching profession, was also prepared. This publication has been 
translated into twenty-four languages, partly with the help of grants from the League, and 
about 250.000 copies have been printed.”). 
174. Id. (noting that as a result of the recommendations of the sub-committee, thirty-
three states took steps “to introduce instruction in regard to the League into the curricula of 
primary and secondary schools.”). 
175. Id. (noting how twenty-three governments dealt with “the recommendations of the 
Sub-Committee of Experts in ministerial notes or special communications in their official 
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line with contemporary ideas of international affairs,176 (e) programs for the 
exchange of school children and teachers,177 (f) national conferences of 
teachers,178 and (g) revision of textbooks179 through the adoption of the Cas-
ares resolution.180
The American Committees on Intellectual Cooperation also made ef-
forts to instill an awareness of the principles of moral disarmament through 
the educational system in America. The adoption of the American Declara-
tion on Moral Disarmament by the American Council on Education was 
considered a “turning point in the policies of the Department of Educa-
tion.”181 Another success was influencing the curriculum of all schools ho-
listically in the United States by “substitute[ing] for its Year Book for 1934 
the subject of Moral Disarmament, (or better, International Civics).”182 As 
can be gauged from this discussion, education was considered to be one of 
the important influencers for the dissemination of the principle of moral dis-
armament. Every avenue was explored, from school curriculum to training 
of teachers, as well as methods to achieve intellectual collaboration and co-
operation. Apart from education, questions of a legal character were also 
discussed widely in connection with the principle of moral disarmament, as 
explained in the following sub-Section.
journals and have encouraged the publication of special manuals and works dealing with the 
League and international co-operation.”). 
176. Id. (noting how nineteen governments took “active steps to promote the revision of 
school text-books in order to adapt them to modern ideas on international relations.”). 
177. Id. (noting how fourteen states had directly encouraged the interchange of school 
children and teachers). 
178. Id. (noting how three governments had “convened national conferences of teachers 
with a view to adopting the recommendations of the Sub-Committee of Experts to the special 
needs of their country.”). 
179. Id. at 9 (describing how the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation con-
ducted various studies on this aspect and published a report containing several recommenda-
tions regarding “revision of school text-books; methods of teaching history and of editing 
text-books; how to reconcile historical truth with goodwill towards foreign nations; the part 
that can be played by teachers and professors and by public administrations[,]” with the report 
going on to be “a basis for the work of a Committee of Experts . . . includ[ing] the representa-
tives of the Teaching Commission of the International Committee on Historical Science, edu-
cationalists, institutes for the scientific study of international relations and the Sub-Committee 
of Experts for the Instruction of Youth in the Aims of the League.”). 
180. Id. (noting how the Casares resolution was adopted with regard to revision of 
school textbooks in 1925). 
181. Moral Disarmament: Correspondence with Dr. James T. Shotwell, supra note 145
(regarding Moral Disarmament) (explaining that at a meeting of the National Education Asso-
ciation at Minneapolis in March 1933 the Department of Superintendents of Education, “a
very reactionary body, nationalist to the core, and yet, on hearing the declaration for Moral 
Disarmament, it, for the first time, not only accepted it but passed a unanimous resolution in 
favor of it,” which was a turning point in the policies of the Department of Education). 
182. Id. at 2.
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2. Legislation and Moral Disarmament
The Committee on Moral Disarmament considered the principle of 
moral disarmament from a “juridical and constitutional” point of view.183 It 
considered legislative change an important factor in the attainment of moral 
disarmament. The Committee also believed that states should adopt the in-
ternational perspective in their domestic legislation, especially while con-
sidering the maintenance of harmony in international relations.184 Domestic 
legislation should reflect the de-legitimization of war and aggression from 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact.185 A consequence of such legislation would be to 
introduce criminalization of actions promoting war and aggression. Actions 
intended to incite international hatred and undermine, in any manner what-
soever, the relationship of mutual trust and harmony between states would 
fall under the purview of such legislation and constitute punishable offens-
es.186
These recommendations were not merely theoretical. States around the 
world already implemented similar provisions into their domestic legisla-
tion.187 Examples were provided from the draft penal codes of Brazil,188 Ro-
183. Report of the Committee for Moral Disarmament at the End of the First session of 
the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, supra note 124, at 2; Prelim-
inary Report of the Work of the Conference, supra note 105, at 144. 
184. See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note 
97, at 2.
185. See Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference, supra note 105, at 145 (pro-
posing that “the contracting parties should undertake, when reviewing their constitutions, fa-
vourably to consider the introduction of articles forbidding any resort to force as an instrument 
of national policy, thus embodying the principles of the Pact of Paris as an integral part of the 
positive law of the State”); Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, 
supra note 97, at 2. 
186. See Proposals of the Polish Delegation with Regard to the Gradual Attainment of 
Moral Disarmament, supra note 105, at 1 (including actions that were linked to creating dis-
harmony in international relationships, like warmongering, inciting of hatred against foreign 
people or States); Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference, supra note 105, at 144, 
145 (listing the acts to be covered by this legislation as including “the preparation and execu-
tion in the territory of a [s]tate of measures directed against the safety of a foreign [p]ower, 
efforts to induce a state to commit certain specified acts in violation of its international obliga-
tions, the aiding or abetting of armed bands formed in the territory of a [s]tate and invading 
the territory of another[s]tate, the dissemination of false information likely to disturb interna-
tional relations or the false attribution to a foreign [s]tate of actions likely to bring it into pub-
lic contempt or hatred”); Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government,
supra note 97, at 2.
187. See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note 
97, at 2 (noting how these recommendations on penal legislation also were discussed at the 
First International Conference for the Unification of Criminal Law in 1927). 
188. Id. (explaining that the Brazilian penal code contains a provision that punishes per-
sons who “stir[] up popular agitation with a view to exerting pressure on the Government in 
favour of war whilst diplomatic negotiations are in progress with a foreign country . . . .”). 
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mania,189 and Poland.190 One of the recommendations made by the Polish 
delegation targeted organizations “whose aims appear to be legal,” but are 
observed to be involved with activities dangerous to peace and security. It 
was suggested that penalties applicable to organizations with illegal aims 
ought to be extended to organizations hiding behind a legal veil.191 This 
would, in effect, counter anti-peace movements or measures calculated to 
incite disharmony. It was further recommended that, after reviewing the de-
liberations relating to reforming national legislation, delegates could con-
sider the possibility of an international convention for legislation that 
“would give impetus to the principle of moral disarmament.”192 The legal 
aspect of moral disarmament was just as important as the educational as-
pect. If education could shape the path of moral disarmament in the future, 
legislation would ensure that principles of moral disarmament are effective 
in the relations between states and in their internal affairs as well. However, 
the task of communicating the principles of moral disarmament to the wid-
est audience possible would fall on the media and broadcasting outlets, as 
explained in the following sub-Section.
3. Cinema, Broadcasting, and Moral Disarmament
If education was a method to inject the principles of moral disarmament 
into the thinking of young people and future generations, broadcasting was 
the avenue through which the principles of moral disarmament could influ-
ence multitudes of people. The cinema and the radio were channels that 
could easily influence public opinion and thus could prove to be excellent 
carriers of moral disarmament principles. Broadcasting also could be used 
for educational purposes by disseminating the principles of moral disarma-
ment.193 Recommendations with regard to broadcasting included drawing up 
189. See Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Survey of Pro-
posals Made by Various Delegations During the General Discussion, at 20–21, League of 
Nations Doc. Conf.D.99 (1932) (noting how “R[o]mania was the first country to introduce in 
her Draft Penal Code the offence of war propaganda” and how Romania intends to bring her 
internal law into line with the new international law, thus taking a step toward the achieve-
ment of the principle of moral disarmament). 
190. See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note 
97, at 2 (noting how the penal codes of Brazil, Romania and Poland contained a provision 
“that any person guilty of incitement to war shall be punished with imprisonment”).
191. Id. at 2. 
192. Proposals of the Polish Delegation with Regard to the Gradual Attainment of Mor-
al Disarmament, supra note 105, at 1; Survey of Proposals Made by Various Delegations 
During the General Discussion, supra note 189, at 20–21 (noting how the Romanian delega-
tion suggested that “international conventions should be concluded for the universal preven-
tion and punishment of war propaganda and all individual acts likely to disturb international 
relations.”). 
193. See Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International 
Organisation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 3, 9 (noting how the Committee 
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a general convention on broadcasting following the principles of moral dis-
armament, suggestions for governments to apply principles of moral dis-
armament in all interactions with broadcasters and broadcasting stations, us-
ing censorship to restrict content in cinema that was likely to cause hatred 
and ill-will between states and incite warmongering,194 and incentivizing the 
creation of content that would spread messages of peace, harmony, mutual 
respect, and tolerance in international relations.195
In addition, suggestions were made to produce a series of educational 
films that would be useful to educators in promoting the work of moral dis-
armament, drawing content from the League and its aims regarding world 
peace and harmony. The films would be devoted to cultures and heritages of 
various states, which would demonstrate “the economic, political and cul-
tural interdependence of the nations.”196 Broadcasting would also be used to 
provide “objective accounts of international problems and a variety of talks 
to promote knowledge of foreign nations.”197
An extract from a 1931 agreement between Polish and German broad-
casting companies was used as an example of achieving moral disarmament 
through broadcasting. Clauses of interest in this regard included a right of 
one party to carry on a certain amount of positive propaganda with respect 
to its domestic activities while ensuring that the subject matter would not 
offend the national sentiment of the audience of the other party. Another ex-
ample from this agreement of the use of broadcasting to foster goodwill be-
tween two states—and thus disseminate the principles of moral disarma-
ment—was an undertaking to ensure that the subject of any broadcast would 
not undermine the goodwill and understanding between the states.198 Cinema 
and broadcasting were great channels to immerse people from various 
spheres of life in the spirit of moral disarmament. It was hoped that even 
lighthearted entertainment would leave a lasting impression. Finally, the 
press could introduce an introspective aspect to the development of moral 
disarmament, which would invite public discussion and engagement in this 
arena.
on Intellectual Co-operation sought an enquiry into “the educational aspects of broadcasting,”
with questions related to “the use of wireless [broadcasting]” being included in the enquiry). 
194. See id. at 3 (explaining how the League’s Institute of Educational Cinematography 
in Rome dealt with aspects of “[c]inematographic activities of an international character”).
195. See Proposals of the Polish Delegation with Regard to the Gradual Attainment of 
Moral Disarmament, supra note 105, at 2.
196. Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International Organ-
isation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 9.
197. Id. at 3.
198. See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note 
97, at 4.
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4. The Press and Moral Disarmament
The press is—or rather should be—the gatekeeper of the flow of public 
opinion on domestic and international events.199 If the principles of moral 
disarmament could be included in all press activities, then moral disarma-
ment eventually could be embedded in public opinion through fairness and 
reasonableness while reporting, inter alia.200 Issues relating to moral dis-
armament and the press were discussed at a press conference at Geneva in 
1927.201
The main issue was that, while the press could be counted on to dissem-
inate messages of peace and harmony, certain sections of the press, through 
irresponsible reporting or other factors, could also create waves of panic, 
repression, disharmony, and hatred through their channels of broadcast.202
Therefore, it was important to get the full support of the International Asso-
ciations of Journalists in order to find a solution for the issue of the press.203
Furthermore, the issue of the press was delicate; any suggestions would 
have to be offered with caution so as not to hinder freedom of speech.204
Punishing an author whose reports have, for example, created anti-peace 
demonstrations or security implications would amount to placing re-
strictions on the freedom of the press. Instead, it was recommended that au-
thors be given a chance to correct the wrong information, including “extend-
ing the application of the right of reply (rectification) so as to include 
foreign Governments.”205 The establishment of an international disciplinary 
tribunal for journalists was also suggested as a way to deal with journalists 
“charged with pursuing activities dangerous to peace.”206 An interesting 
suggestion in this regard was to enlist the assistance of the press, at a con-
ference of the press, to help develop a framework “capable of safeguarding 
international interests without compromising the freedom of the Press.”207
Despite these perceived dangers with the press, those at the Conference 
believed that the press could be channeled to work as a strong facilitator of 
moral disarmament by choosing to always exercise “a positive pacific influ-
199. See generally C. Edwin Baker, The Media that Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
317 (1998); Jonathan M. Moses, Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of 
Public Opinion, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1811 (1995).
200. See Proposals of the Polish Delegation with Regard to the Gradual Attainment of 
Moral Disarmament, supra note 105, at 1.
201. See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note 
97, at 5.
202. See id. at 2–3, 5.
203. See id. at 4–5.
204. See id. at 3.
205. Id. (explanatory parenthetical added).
206. Id.
207. Id.
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ence” and “refraining from envenoming disputes . . . .”208 An “immediate 
improvement in international relations” and “the educative effect” of re-
sponsible channels of the press would be examples of such outcomes.209 The 
International Organization on Intellectual Cooperation had several affilia-
tions with international associations of journalists, and so it proposed to 
work with the representatives of the press to involve the press in facilitating 
the promotion of moral disarmament.210
This Section shows that the proponents of moral disarmament saw edu-
cation, intellectual cooperation, legislation, broadcasting, cinema, and the 
press as the best channels to help with the progressive realization of moral 
disarmament. The following Section explores the broader support for the 
principle of moral disarmament once it was introduced through these chan-
nels.
E. Support for Moral Disarmament
Support for the principle of moral disarmament was immediate and ac-
tive. Apart from the efforts of the International Organization on Intellectual 
Cooperation and various National Committees of Intellectual Cooperation, 
the delegates at the Disarmament Conference commended the call for moral 
disarmament.
The Romanian delegate, in his speech during the general discussion, 
stated that the proposals concerning moral disarmament had to be followed 
to the letter, as “organi[z]ed moral disarmament is a primordial condition 
for military disarmament . . . .”211 In this regard, action by parents, teachers, 
governments, the press, religious organizations, and cinema was vital in 
achieving moral disarmament.212 The delegate from Persia expressed his 
wholehearted support for moral disarmament and urged the delegates at the 
208. Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International Organ-
isation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 2 (noting how, with regard to questions 
concerning co-operation of the Press, the sub-committee used a draft resolution proposed by 
the Polish Government as a reference point for its discussions, and that representatives of in-
ternational groups of journalists were given an opportunity to air their views and help the de-
liberations; noting how a preliminary statement on these matters was to be prepared and sub-
mitted to the Committee for Moral Disarmament); see also Report of the Committee for 
Moral Disarmament at the End of the First Session of the Conference for the Reduction and 
Limitation of Armaments, supra note 124, at 2.
209. Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International Organ-
isation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 2.
210. See id. at 2.
211. Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Verbatim Record (Re-
vised) of the Twelfth Plenary Meeting, League of Nations Doc. Conf. D./P.V.12(1) (1932), 
http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le000440.pdf; see also Survey of Proposals 
Made by Various Delegations During the General Discussion, supra note 189, at 20–21. 
212. Verbatim Record (Revised) of the Twelfth Plenary Meeting, supra note 211, at 3; 
Survey of Proposals Made by Various Delegations During the General Discussion, supra note 
189, at 20–21.
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Conference to use every method proposed to achieve moral disarmament.213
The Spanish delegate referred to the importance of following the principles 
of moral disarmament and emphasized that the “psychological” character of 
moral disarmament was the key to achieving disarmament.214 The Canadian 
delegate impressed upon the other delegates the importance of achieving 
peace through preventing conflicts rather than imposition of sanctions, thus 
highlighting the importance of moral disarmament in the work of disarma-
ment.215 The Belgian delegate stated that the provision of safeguards and 
protection in the juridical organization of peace at an equivalent level of 
armed defense was necessary to achieve disarmament.216 The Chinese dele-
gate spoke about the benefit of abolishing “existing systems and measures” 
that encouraged and fostered the spirit of aggression and warmongering 
among peoples in order to promote disarmament.217 The Polish delegate 
stressed the importance of creating “security and stability” in international 
relations, which would be the cornerstone of disarmament, and that the first 
step was moral disarmament.218 The delegate from Czechoslovakia made an 
important point with regard to moral disarmament when he spoke of “per-
manently stable conditions” and “reconciliation” among the states that were 
previously adversaries.219 He referred to “moral and psychological forces” of 
moral disarmament as the only way to effect a reconciliation that would 
contribute to lasting peace and solidarity.220 The Treaty of Friendship and 
Compulsory Arbitration between Czechoslovakia and Austria in this regard 
was mentioned as an illustrative example.221 The Panamanian delegation ex-
213. Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armament, Verbatim Record (Re-
vised) of the Eleventh Plenary Meeting, League of Nations Doc. Conf. D./P.V.11(1) (1932); 
Survey of Proposals Made by Various Delegations During the General Discussion, supra note 
189, at 19.
214. Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Verbatim Record (Re-
vised) of the Eighth Plenary Meeting, League of Nations Doc. Conf. D./P.V.8(1) (1932), http:/
/digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le000436.pdf; Survey of Proposals Made by Various 
Delegations During the General Discussion, supra note 189, at 21.
215. See Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Verbatim Record 
(Revised) of the Ninth Plenary Meeting, League of Nations Doc. Conf. D./P.V.9(1) (1932), 
http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le000437.pdf; Survey of Proposals Made by 
Various Delegations During the General Discussion, supra note 189, at 15. 
216. Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Verbatim Record (Re-
vised) of the Seventh Plenary Meeting, League of Nations Doc. Conf. D./P.V.7(1) (1932), 
http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le000435.pdf; Survey of Proposals Made by 
Various Delegations During the General Discussion, supra note 189, at 14. 
217. See Survey of Proposals Made by Various Delegations During the General Discus-
sion, supra note 189, at 50. 
218. Arbitration, Security and Reduction of Armaments: Extracts from the Debates of 
the Fifth Assembly Including Those of the First and Third Committees, at 14–15, League of 
Nation, Doc. C.708.1924.IX.(C.C.O.1) (1924) [hereinafter Extracts from the Debates]. 
219. Id. at 31–32.
220. Id. at 32.
221. See id. 
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pressed its support for the principles of moral disarmament and emphasized 
that they were successfully used in Panama for a few decades.222 For exam-
ple, after the Treaty of Hay-Bunau-Varilla, the Panamanian government de-
cided not to maintain the expense of a standing army and used the funds to 
develop education, infrastructure, and other public works.223
In addition to the contribution of the Polish delegation and the Interna-
tional Organization on Intellectual Cooperation to the principle of moral 
disarmament, the effusive vocal support professed by the other states lent 
significant momentum to the moral disarmament movement. The following 
Section explores the importance of moral disarmament in the broader de-
bates happening at that time.
F. Importance of Moral Disarmament
In the interwar period, despite many deliberations and agreements on 
material disarmament, there was a marked increase in the number of arma-
ments rather than the expected decreases, which many saw as a disturbing 
trend.224 This increase in armaments gave impetus to the moral disarmament 
movement, which considered that it was important to simultaneously pursue 
material and moral disarmament.225 One could not be considered more im-
portant than the other.226 In other words, material and moral disarmament 
had to be regarded as two sides of the same coin. Nevertheless, it was be-
lieved that peace through the moral disarmament principle would be more 
deeply rooted and create a more stable environment than “providing for 
sanctions.”227 In the interwar period, it was important for states to cultivate 
friendly relations with their adversaries in the past war in order for their 
peoples to attempt a genuine reconciliation with each other and thus enable 
mutual respect and confidence in their international relations.228 This was 
seen as the only way that true stability could be built into the international 
system.229
222. See id. at 35–36 (referring to the Treaty of Hay-Bunau Varilla and noting how after 
the Treaty of Hay-Bunau Varilla, the Panamanian government decided not to maintain the 
expense of a standing army and used the funds to develop education, in infrastructure, and 
other public works). 
223. See id.
224. See Verbatim Record (Revised) of the Ninth Plenary Meeting, supra note 215; see 
also Survey of Proposals Made by Various Delegations During the General Discussion, supra
note 189, at 15. 
225. See Extracts from the Debates, supra note 218.
226. See generally Survey of Proposals Made by Various Delegations During the Gen-
eral Discussion, supra note 189.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 31–32.
229. See id.
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Ultimately, the adoption of the idea of moral disarmament at the Dis-
armament Conference was unsuccessful.230 Instead, it went into hibernation 
due to the political realities after Germany decided to end its involvement 
with the conference.231 In short, after the Second World War, states busied 
themselves with rebuilding economies, and the principles of moral dis-
armament were forgotten. Nevertheless, the efforts made during the inter-
war period—especially during the Disarmament Conference—created im-
portant principles that are every bit as relevant today as they were then. 
With the rise in global nationalism in the past few years and the general re-
treat of international human rights,232 the focus of moral disarmament on in-
tellectual cooperation is particularly important. As moral disarmament pro-
ponents during the interwar period identified, “it is in the intellectual 
domain that the forces of nationalism seem to be less opposed to the eventu-
al reaching of a harmonious understanding.”233 The paradigm of moral dis-
armament might help states eventually overcome that nationalism and work 
toward harmonious understanding.
This Article does not describe a reality where a connection between ed-
ucation, intellectual collaboration, and channels of broadcasting already ex-
ists, let alone one that promotes the achievement of peaceful and harmoni-
ous relations between states, all in the context of broad disarmament. 
Instead, this Article presents a normative argument for connecting all of 
these elements together under the banner of moral disarmament, as the in-
ternational community tried during the interwar period. States could achieve 
meaningful disarmament by promoting/increasing international collabora-
tions between the arts, sciences, humanities, and other faculties through ed-
ucation and teaching. Such collaborations could be enhanced further 
through cooperation between intellectual circles, domestic penal legislation, 
cinema, broadcasting, and the press. Such international cooperation could 
lead to greater international and domestic stability and would in turn pro-
mote disarmament through society for society as a whole. Another effect of 
increased international collaboration in various aspects of society would be 
the intrinsic development of a society attuned to disarmament. The follow-
ing Part explains the connection between development and disarmament in 
230. See Moral Disarmament: Correspondence with Dr. James T. Shotwell, supra note 
145 (Dr. Shotwell believed that the importance of all the initiatives taken by the Committees 
of Intellectual Co-operation and the American National Committee on International Intellec-
tual Co-operation would depend on “the completion of a treaty by the Disarmament Confer-
ence[.]” Further, he noted that, if moral disarmament was ensconced within a Disarmament 
treaty, it would “especially mean a justification of the C.I.C.” He also observed that, even 
though material disarmament was being called for, moral disarmament might “prove ultimate-
ly to be as important as anything that the Treaty could contain[.]”). 
231. See F.P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 550 (1950) (discuss-
ing how Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference).
232. See generally Ingrid Wuerth, International Law in the Post-Human Rights Era, 96 
TEX. L. REV. 279 (2017).
233. Moral Disarmament: Correspondence with Dr. James T. Shotwell, supra note 145.
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order for states to think about resurrecting, in contemporary society, the 
principles of moral disarmament they eagerly supported during the interwar 
period.
IV. Development and Disarmament
During the interwar period, states discussed the concept of moral dis-
armament and made several recommendations to achieve disarmament 
through the intrinsic development of society. Although the idea of moral 
disarmament did not succeed during the interwar period, it is suggested that 
reviving the principles of moral disarmament can help contemporary socie-
ties walk the path of economic development and international cooperation. 
This Part looks at the relationship between disarmament and development.
During times of war, states focus on building armaments, and develop-
ment is not a focal point in terms of allocation of resources. An overview of 
the consequences of war in denominations of facts and figures can only be, 
at best, an over-simplification of the destruction and damage caused not on-
ly during the conflict but also to the environment and future generations of 
humankind. These facts and figures, though woefully inadequate in provid-
ing a true estimate of destruction, nevertheless are valuable inasmuch as 
they provide thought-provoking insights into the resources consumed during 
these conflicts. A comparison of rough estimates of the cost of the First 
World War to the cost of all wars in the world from 1793 to 1910 presents a 
dramatic picture of the magnitude of that war. The cost of more than 100 
years of wars ($23 billion) in different parts of the world pales in compari-
son to the cost of four years of continuous war ($186 billion) during the 
First World War.234 Furthermore, a rough estimate of Germany’s reparation 
burden for the First World War (for the next 40 years) was estimated as less 
than the amount that the United States would spend in the next 40 years if it 
continued at the same rate of armament as in the immediate aftermath of the 
First World War.235
The thought-provoking aspect of these estimates lies in the appropria-
tion of funds among various demands on a state’s purse. As an example, ex-
amining the figures for the United States’ appropriations in 1920 shows that 
an astonishing 93 percent of the demands on the state purse were devoted to 
wars—past, present, and future—while the meager remains were divided 
among the civil departments (3 percent), public works (3 percent), and a 
paltry 1 percent to research, education, and health.236 Resources available to 
a state are not a magician’s infinite pool of plenty, and, therefore, as one 
demand on the purse increases, other demands are relegated to a lower posi-
tion. War destroys more than just the lives of people on the battlefront. It 
234. See DISARMAMENT EDUCATION COMMITTEE, FACTS ON DISARMAMENT 3 (1921), 
http://libraryresources.unog.ch/ld.php?content_id=19934100.
235. See id. at 13. 
236. See id. at 5. 
38 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 40:1
also impacts the livelihood of millions of people and cuts off any hope of a 
stable, industrious, and peaceful future. As states focus on arming and forti-
fying their military resources, they inevitably draw resources away from es-
sential requirements of society. This results in a malnourished, underdevel-
oped society that is unable to ascend the pyramid of economic and social 
development and consequently fails to resist baser desires to resolve con-
flicts through war and aggression.
Public opinion during the time of the 1932 Disarmament Conference 
was strongly pushing for efforts to substantially reduce military expenditure 
and to reduce armaments.237 The Disarmament Conference cautioned the 
world that even a status quo relating to armaments at the levels in 1932 con-
stituted “a menace” to world peace.238 The opening remarks at the Disarma-
ment Conference included a reminder to all governments that “the problem 
of disarmament” was “vitally relevant to the grave economic and financial 
crisis” most states were facing.239 It was acknowledged that the economic 
and financial crisis that gripped the world in the interwar period was causal-
ly linked to “the financial burden of armaments and of past wars . . . .”240 In 
addition, a large number of countries agreed that the financial burden of ar-
maments was a “principle cause of unbalanced budgets . . . .”241 The dele-
gates at the conference confirmed that an average estimate of expenditure 
toward military defense and armaments was in the range of an astonishing 
“4,000 million dollars a year.”242
At the Disarmament Conference, governments were cautioned that, in 
view of the immense expenditure on military purposes, the increased alloca-
tions of national incomes were all to be the indirect burden of the taxpayer 
and that such a burden would be at the cost of his or her development in so-
ciety.243 Therefore, it was proposed that definite progress in the direction of 
general disarmament would, “at once, lighten the onerous financial burden 
and bring a much-needed measure of relief to the world beset by grave eco-
nomic difficulties[.]”244 The discussions at the Disarmament Conference 
thus indicate that the international community accepted the nexus between 
disarmament and development.
In the period following the Second World War, states focused on re-
building their economies. The international community continued to support 
237. See Verbatim Record (Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting, supra note 48, at 7
(noting how national and international organizations had requested for the opportunity of pre-
senting petitions with regard to disarmament to the Disarmament Conference).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. (noting that the estimate of “4,000 million dollars a year” was the cost for 61 
states in the 4–5 years preceding the Disarmament Conference). 
243. See id.
244. Id.
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the disarmament and development connection. The support is evident from 
an examination of “proposals by a politically and geographically broad 
spectrum of states since the early days of the United Nations.”245 The 1987 
Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development246
had three issues on its agenda before it started.247 The first issue was to con-
sider the “[r]elationship between disarmament and development in all its as-
pects and dimensions[.]”248 The second issue was to consider the 
“[i]mplications of the level and magnitude of military expenditures, in par-
ticular those of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily important States, 
for the world economy and the international economic and social situation, 
particularly for the developing countries, and formulation of appropriate 
recommendations for remedial measures[.]”249 The third issue was to con-
sider “[w]ays and means of releasing additional resources, through dis-
armament measures, for development purposes, in particular for the benefit 
of developing countries[.]”250
Apart from States, non-governmental agencies and organizations also 
supported the causal linkage between disarmament and the development of 
society. Peaceful international cooperation, women’s rights and liberation, 
stable economies, and social benefits were considered important to devel-
opment and disarmament. Peace through disarmament was among the vari-
ous causes championed by women’s organizations around the world during 
the interwar period. The Disarmament Committee of the International
Women’s Organizations worked tirelessly to spread awareness of the prin-
ciples of moral disarmament and its advantages for a stable and peaceful so-
ciety.251 An emphasis on social benefits, women’s liberation, and the devel-
opment of society that provides welfare to its peoples have featured in the 
agenda for peace through disarmament. The costs of war include far-
reaching effects on the lives of women, and such a consideration is “[o]ne of 
the constitutive positions of antiwar feminism . . . .”252
245. International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Develop-
ment, Final Document, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E.87.IX.8 (Sept. 30, 1987); see also RIETIKER, supra
note 10, at 244–45.
246. Pursuant to General Assembly Resolutions 39/160 and 40/155.
247. See Final Document, supra note 245, at iii; Report of the International Conference 
on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.130/39 
(Aug. 24, 1987). 
248. Final Document, supra note 245, at iii.
249. Id. at iii.
250. Id.
251. See Carol Cohn & Sara Ruddick, A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, ETHICS AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 405, 417 (Sohail H. 
Hashmi & Steven P. Lee eds., 2004).
252. Id. at 417; see generally Naomi R. Cahn, Women in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: 
Dilemmas and Directions, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 335 (2006). 
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The difference in the economic and developmental conditions of states 
cannot be ignored in a discussion regarding the social costs of war.253 The 
situation only worsens in underdeveloped states where people still live in 
abject poverty, as such states have many important demands and limited re-
sources to fund them. In order to arrive at development levels that can pro-
vide citizens with stable economic and social developmental growth, states 
need to expend resources on infrastructure, food, water, education, and other 
essential services.254 Therefore, in a situation where an increase in arma-
ments is called for,255 “the social costs” of the call to arms are at a level that 
is dangerous to society and its development.256 The problem certainly is not 
restricted to developing states. For example, the United States, which is one 
of the most developed countries in the world, has “an appreciable number of 
people” who cannot afford healthcare, while its nuclear weapons program 
costs a whopping “4.5 trillion dollars.”257
Several states absolutely cannot afford to reduce the already threadbare 
budgets available for social and economic development in order to use the 
funds for expansion of their armory. However, in the face of uncertainty in 
international relations, an international security crisis, an escalation of ten-
sions between states, or the introduction of an arms race between neighbor-
ing states, it is inevitable that such funds will be reallocated to military ex-
penditures. A recent example is Mozambique’s purchase of expensive 
warships at the expense of necessary government services for its people.258
In principle, resources that are needed for social welfare and the betterment 
of the human race ought not to be squandered on an armaments race, wheth-
er the aim is defense through attack or deterrence. Even “the threat” of a rise 
in armaments will disrupt the equilibrium between states and prevent a 
“consolidation of peaceful and harmonious relationships . . . .”259 There can 
be no discussion related to economic and social development when the 
foundations of international cooperation and trust are uncertain. It is inevi-
table that budgetary difficulties caused by large allocations to armaments 
will lead to economic and social issues and disorganized credit and will par-
253. See Cohn & Ruddick, supra note 251, at 417.
254. See id.
255. B.W. Patch, World Disarmament Conference of 1932, CQ PRESS (1932), http://
library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1932010500#H2 (noting that the 
cost to the treasury of building an armed defense is “a tremendous deadweight of costs” con-
stituting “a drain on the national resources of all nations which has not only helped to bring 
about and to aggravate the present economic world crisis but is also actively impeding recov-
ery[.]”).
256. Cohn & Ruddick, supra note 251, at 417.
257. Id. at 418; see also William P. Quigley, Revolutionary Lawyering: Addressing the 
Root Causes of Poverty and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 101, 138–42 (2006).  
258. See African Debt: Rearing Its Odious Head Once More, ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 
2018, at 18.
259. Patch, supra note 255.
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alyze initiatives.260 Therefore, it can be said that, generally, the growth in the 
number of armaments negatively impacts development.261
A focus on the development of society using the principles of moral 
disarmament might help foster peace and mutual trust in international rela-
tions. A society that promotes peace and solidarity in their international re-
lations will resist the desire to go to war or resolve disputes through aggres-
sion. Therefore, more thought should be given to moral disarmament, and 
more attention should be given to the connection between development and 
disarmament. In short, the difference between “global military expenditures 
and unmet socio-economic needs provides a compelling moral appeal” in 
connecting development and disarmament.262 The nexus between disarma-
ment and development is not difficult to either establish or understand.263 It 
is a directly proportional relationship. A society that seeks to develop to its 
fullest potential must necessarily have the principles of peace, understand-
ing, respect, and tolerance in connection with its international relations. A 
society that revives the principles of moral disarmament in its day-to-day 
affairs will also use similar principles in its foreign policies and accept 
peaceful international relations as a norm. Such a society will have peace at 
the foundation of its international relations and will be able to focus a major 
portion of its resources on development.
Thus, a society that is attuned to principles of moral disarmament can 
achieve permanent stability in its economic and social spheres of life. Peo-
ple who are nurtured in such stable environments and realize the advantages 
of international solidarity will, as a corollary, be more amenable to walking 
on the path of disarmament and harmony between states.
V. Moral Disarmament and Nuclear Weapons
It is said that we learn from history. Throughout the ages, war has been 
an instrument to protect and preserve oneself and one’s own from foreign 
marauders and rampages. However, the untold devastation wrought by two 
world wars has taken its toll on the positive symbolism of war. The pream-
ble of the United Nations Charter stands witness to this fact. The preamble 
of the Charter also promotes “social progress and better standards of life in 
260. Verbatim Record (Revised) of the Ninth Plenary Meeting, supra note 215, at 105; 
see also Survey of Proposals Made by Various Delegations During the General Discussion,
supra note 189, at 14. 
261. See Arbitration, Security and Reduction of Armaments: Extracts from the Debates 
of the Fifth Assembly Including Those of the First and Third Committees, supra note 218, at 
35–36 (providing an example by the delegation from Panama, that after the Treaty of Hay-
Bunau Varilla the government decided “to free the people from the burdens and dangers in-
volved in the maintenance of a standing army[,]” with the “sums thus released from the public 
treasury hav[ing] been employed in the development of education, in the construction of new 
roads and in new public works.”).
262. Final Document, supra note 245, at 2.
263. See RIETIKER, supra note 10, at 244–45.
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larger freedom,” peace and tolerance in international relations, and directs 
states to “employ international machinery for the promotion of the econom-
ic and social advancement of all peoples.”264 War no longer is considered a 
lawful method of resolving disputes outside of self-defense, authorized col-
lective action, and occasionally for humanitarian reasons. The need of inter-
national society is development, economic security, stability in international 
relations, and an environment free from uncertainties of aggression and hos-
tilities in order for it to reach its fullest potential. The issue of nuclear dis-
armament is one of the obstacles in the path to stability and peace in interna-
tional relations. During the interwar period, states discussed means of using 
principles of moral disarmament to achieve stability and peace in interna-
tional relations and in the process walk the path of disarmament. During the 
interwar period, there was no fear of nuclear weapons. Today, however, nu-
clear armaments are the most destructive weapons that are available to man.
Despite the destructive nature of nuclear weapons, and despite the fact 
that the world in so many ways has yet to come to terms with the repercus-
sions of the use of the atomic bomb, the issue of nuclear disarmament has 
not made any significant progress, despite considerable international delib-
erations on the issue. Therefore, it is suggested that the principles of moral 
disarmament be applied by states to achieve nuclear disarmament.
The question of disarmament has become even more significant and 
sensitive in connection with nuclear weapons as compared to conventional 
weapons. The disarmament discussions in the interwar period had negotiat-
ing parties that could, in theory, be considered to be on a level playing field, 
discounting for financial capabilities. However, they all had weapons in 
their military arsenals that they were seeking to limit. Furthermore, there 
was a common intention that brought them all to the disarmament negotiat-
ing table. With respect to nuclear weapons, there is neither a level playing 
field nor a common intention that can be ascribed to the discussions and ne-
gotiations relating to nuclear disarmament. In fact, it is not too much to state 
that there is no common objective today driving all the states to deliberate at 
the nuclear disarmament negotiating table. However, despite permanent 
members of the UN Security Council paying lip service to general nuclear 
disarmament,265 many other states are working toward making disarmament 
a reality through the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.266
Nuclear-weapon states are occupied with the unease of a non-nuclear-
weapon state violating its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (the “NPT”). Non-nuclear-weapon states are worried about the lack 
of progress in reduction by nuclear-weapons states of their nuclear-weapon 
arsenals. It is no wonder, then, that no significant commitments have been 
264. See U.N. Charter pmbl.
265. See S.C. Res. 1887, at 1 (Sept. 24, 2009).
266. See generally U.N. Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Pro-
hibit Nuclear Weapons, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.229/2017/8 (July 7, 2017).
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made at any of the Review Conferences of the NPT toward nuclear dis-
armament, despite efforts to highlight the repercussions of the use of nuclear 
weapons on human life. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan empha-
sized the consequences of “a nuclear catastrophe” in terms of human and 
economic development to the delegates at the 2005 NPT Review Confer-
ence.267
Since all other efforts seem to have reached a standoff, it may be useful 
to pursue nuclear disarmament through the lens of moral disarmament. As 
alluded to in the introduction of this Article, the Nobel Peace Prize of 2017 
was awarded to an advocacy group that campaigns for the abolition of nu-
clear weapons. They push for nuclear disarmament based on the humanitar-
ian principle from the IHL tradition, not from the broader human motive 
that Passy alluded to in the introductory quote and as advocated for in this 
Article. Both share the goal of nuclear disarmament. However, this Article 
posits that the creation of a peaceful and stable society is needed before nu-
clear disarmament can be fully realized and that the humanitarian principle 
from the IHL tradition is an insufficient basis to get us there.
Following the established procedure of the Disarmament Conference, a 
first step toward implementing the notion of moral disarmament in the arena 
of nuclear weapons is collaboration between societies of intellectual coop-
eration and international agencies to conduct preliminary deliberations on 
the methods of attaining moral disarmament with respect to nuclear weap-
ons. The recommendations of the Committee of Moral Disarmament of the 
1932 Disarmament Conference could be reexamined and redrafted to in-
clude the current stages of development in society. Educational reform 
would be one of the primary areas of focus. The avenues of cinema and 
broadcasting would have to be examined carefully so as not to obstruct any 
fundamental rights. The issue of the press would be as difficult—if not more 
so—today as during the interwar period. Recommendations would have to 
be made without hampering the freedom of the press. The sphere of interna-
tional intellectual cooperation would be a great enabler for recommenda-
tions on moral disarmament in the work of nuclear disarmament.
The process will definitely not be an easy one. However, as all other 
avenues seem to be failing with respect to nuclear disarmament, the path of 
moral disarmament is one that ought to be considered for the gradual and 
progressive attainment of a world free of nuclear weapons.
267. RIETIKER, supra note 10, at 148–49 (quoting Kofi Annan as saying in a speech at 
the 2005 NPT Review Conference, concerning the global impact of the use of nuclear weap-
ons: “Resources for development would likely dwindle. And world financial markets, trade 
and transportation could be hard hit, with major economic consequences. This could drive
millions of people in poor countries into deeper deprivation and suffering.”).
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VI.  Conclusion
In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, a tiny seed of moral 
disarmament was sown in the bleak, war-ravaged landscape of the surviving 
civilizations. The tremendous suffering and destruction caused by that con-
flict awakened the remaining populace to the advantages of peace and soli-
darity in international relations. Mutual respect, tolerance, and an apprecia-
tion of people from different countries were qualities to be cultivated in 
every sphere of public life. That being the case, the environment in the in-
terwar period was extremely beneficial to the growth of the idea of moral 
disarmament. Due to the tireless efforts of international organizations like 
the International Organization on Intellectual Cooperation and other asso-
ciations and organizations working toward peace and mutual respect in eve-
ry aspect of society, deliberations were made about education, the press, the 
cinema, international intellectual collaboration, and legislation, inter alia.
Recommendations were made in respect of every field that could be a carri-
er for embedding the principle of moral disarmament firmly into the minds 
of people across the world in a manner that would last well into the future.
The unfortunate events that commenced in Europe, even as the Dis-
armament Conference was operative, may explain why little progress re-
garding moral disarmament was made after its introduction. Indeed, multi-
ple factors—including Germany’s departure from the Disarmament 
Conference in 1933, the lack of universal participation or even broadly rep-
resentative participation in the Disarmament Conference, the arms race 
leading up to and during the Second World War, and Goebbels war propa-
ganda—meant that the system surrounding the principle of moral disarma-
ment never even had the chance to be established. The arms race continued 
following the Second World War, although the race was between different 
states and with the additional nuclear element. Moreover, the end of the 
Second World War saw the introduction of human rights and the establish-
ment of institutions like the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization (“UNESCO”), which essentially took over the work of 
the International Organization on Intellectual Cooperation in promoting 
these rights in 1946,268 but now without the express connection to disarma-
ment, as was needed in the past. Therefore, moral disarmament suffered a 
premature death almost immediately after its birth.
This Article has posited that the legacy principle of moral disarmament 
should be resurrected and applied to nuclear disarmament, especially since 
human rights and IHL’s principle of humanity has so far failed to make suf-
ficient progress. Moreover, it is difficult to see the Treaty on the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons as representing genuine progress with regard to nuclear 
disarmament on account of the fact that none of the nuclear-weapons states 
are on board. The recommendations made in the interwar period in connec-
268. See C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 470–71 (2d ed. 2005).
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tion with moral disarmament are every bit as relevant to contemporary soci-
ety and issues of nuclear proliferation. If there is any solution to the dead-
lock surrounding nuclear disarmament, it might be found by reexamining 
the principles of moral disarmament and ensuring a method of implementa-
tion in various aspects of public service and civil life. Material and moral 
disarmament have always been interdependent, and for any disarmament 
strategy to be successful, it is of the utmost importance to have parallel de-
velopments in both fields. This holds true for nuclear disarmament as well. 
As Pope John Paul II wrote in 1982, disarmament will not succeed in estab-
lishing peace unless it is accompanied by ethical improvements to various 
aspects of society.269 This is the exact type of division between material and 
moral components of disarmament that was addressed at the 1932 Dis-
armament Conference under the banner of “moral disarmament” and that 
has been promoted in this Article.
269. See McGrath, supra note 15, at 226–27 (citing Pope John Paul II, 
The Necessary Strategy for Peace, ORIGINS, June 24, 1982, at 84–86).
